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Abstract 
 For many decades, demand for agricultural commodities has remained stagnant 
and its growth has been limited. In contrast, agricultural production continues to become 
ever more efficient by increasing output for stable or decreased inputs. Long-run profits 
have historically been near zero due to an ongoing relative equilibrium. But recent U.S. 
energy policy has changed to include a Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS), the goal of 
which is to boost domestic energy independence in an environmentally sound way. Most 
of the RFS in the near-term relies on the production of 15 billion gallons of ethanol made 
from corn. This has the effect of creating a new sector of demand for grain corn and 
subsequently supports rural economies.  
 The RFS creates a new demand for 5.5 billion bushels of corn by 2015. At the 
corn-ethanol conversion ratio of 2.7 gallons per bushel, this will sustain the production of 
15 billion gallons of ethanol. The RFS is a blending floor imposed on gasoline refiners. 
Ethanol producers, on the other hand, are not forced to supply ethanol. While the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has the authority to implement the RFS, it does 
not have the ability to expand ethanol supplies. The U.S. government has therefore 
supported the use of ethanol through a current 45 cent tax credit for each gallon of 
ethanol blended into gasoline. Other financial support programs such as grants and loan 
guarantees are in place for ethanol refiners. 
 Ethanol in the U.S.is primarily made from the starchy molecules in corn. One 
bushel of corn in a dry mill ethanol plant will produce approximately 2.7 gallons of 
ethanol and 17 pounds of dried distillers grains with solubles (DDGS) which can be used 
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in livestock rations. A wet mill plant will produce other by-products. Ethanol can be used 
directly in the nation’s fuel supply at limited levels of blending. Most cars in the United 
States can withstand the corrosive nature of ethanol in blends of up to 10% or more. But 
flex-fuel vehicles, which are able to operate on 85% ethanol are increasingly becoming 
available for sale and their use continues to grow. 
 Corn ethanol is a very complex issue when implemented on such a large scale as 
the RFS dictates. The amount of transportation fuel actually displaced by its use is a hotly 
debated topic. In any case, the large scale production of corn ethanol has created a firm 
link between agricultural markets and the energy sector. Ethanol is also an environmental 
issue. One of the primary goals of the RFS is to combat global warming and whether or 
not this is achieved it currently in debate. Aside from the climate change issue, there are 
other environmental ramifications tied directly to ethanol such as contamination, water 
use and land-use change. 
 Since the inception of the RFS, price volatility and uncertainty has never been 
greater. In the first half of 2008, prices for all commodities reached historically high 
levels. This raises the concern of the impacts with the RFS has on markets other than 
corn. The livestock industry and other grain markets have been affected to some degree 
by the RFS. This is in part due to the changing profile of the major trading participants in 
the commodity trading centers.  
 All of this is related to a structural change which has taken place in the 
agricultural markets as a result of the RFS. Historical relationships between price, supply 
and demand have adjusted and currently continue to adjust. The reasons for the 
adjustments are founded in economic theory regarding system-wide demand shocks. In 
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this case, the demand shock is roughly a net 50% increase in the demand for corn by 
2015 compared to the most recent decade. The adjustments which take place can be 
summarized by three periods. In period 1, the demand curve shifts outward, equilibrium 
is lost and higher corn prices are observed. In period 2, the market struggles to find a new 
equilibrium by increasing output. This period is marked by increased volatility and 
market participants over and under react to price signals until the new equilibrium is 
discovered. Period three is represented by the discovery of a relative market equilibrium 
at price higher than previously, but not as high as the initial demand shock.  
 Results from, a fundamental analysis of the grain markets show that the expected 
market behavior has begun to take place and agriculture finds itself in period 2 of the 
changes described above. While most of the price changes and acreage shifts can be 
explained, the degree to which prices have increased are not fully explained. A change in 
trading center activities (Boards of Trade, etc.) may help to further account for the new 
prices. A survey of brokers shows that the behavior of commercial traders has 
significantly changed since RFS implementation. Volatility and uncertainty have ensued.  
 The consequences of the RFS to the farmer have also been significant. Farm 
income has increased significantly sufficiently to overcome the riding costs of fuel and 
fertilizer. The risk exposure of farmers has also changed; the data indicates that exposure 
to risk has increased greatly. However, the farm gate prices have been more than enough 
to compensate for the changes in risk. 
 
 
 
 
 
vi
 
Acknowledgements 
 Special thanks is due to a multitude of people who furnished support throughout 
the composition of this thesis, both material and emotional. First and foremost has been 
my strong wife, Beki, who has encouraged, prodded and motivated me without 
complaint. She has cared for the matters at home with diligence and honor. Dillon Feuz, 
Ph.D. has been particularly crucial in the completion of this work as he has disbursed 
funding for tuition, research and other expenses. He has also been the most instructive 
friend in my economic approach to career and life. Steve Vickner, Ph.D. has also been a 
good friend and played a key role in setting me in the path toward a graduate degree. 
Finally, the whole Applied Economics Department at U.S.U. is the recipient of my 
deepest gratitude. The entire department made it possible to complete my graduation by 
steady coaching through the most difficult and rewarding semester of my life. In the Fall 
of 2008, I was faced with death in the family, birth of a new daughter and a plethora of 
other complications which the department was gracious enough to help me work around.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vii
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1 
OBJECTIVES................................................................................................................................................. 3 
METHODS.................................................................................................................................................... 3 
THESIS ORGANIZATION ............................................................................................................................... 4 
CHAPTER 2 – BIOFUELS BACKGROUND AND ETHANOL POLICY ............................................ 7 
POLICY AND LEGISLATION .......................................................................................................................... 9 
RENEWABLE FUELS STANDARD ................................................................................................................ 11 
FIANANCING.............................................................................................................................................. 15 
NEW BIIOENERGY DEVELOPMENTS ........................................................................................................... 17 
U.S. ENERGY USE ..................................................................................................................................... 18 
ETHANOL PRODUCTION............................................................................................................................. 19 
ETHANOL CONSUMPTION .......................................................................................................................... 21 
CHAPTER 3 – LITERATURE REVIEW................................................................................................ 24 
ENERGY CONTIRBUTION OF ETHANOL ...................................................................................................... 25 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS ....................................................................................................................... 28 
ECONOMIC IMPACTS.................................................................................................................................. 31 
ARUGMENTS AGAINST ETHANOL................................................................................................................ 35 
IMPACTS ON THE LIVESTOCK INDUSTRY ................................................................................................... 36 
IMPACTS ON GRAIN MARKETS .................................................................................................................. 42 
FOOD VS. FUEL.......................................................................................................................................... 44 
LINKING AGRICULTURE TO ENERGY.......................................................................................................... 45 
COMMODITY FUTURES MARKETS............................................................................................................. 48 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................................. 51 
CHAPTER 4 – THEORETICAL DISCUSSION, METHODS OF ANALYSIS AND DATA............. 52 
ECONOMIC THEORY .................................................................................................................................. 52 
PERIOD 1......................................................................................................................................... 55 
PERIOD 2......................................................................................................................................... 55 
PERIOD 3......................................................................................................................................... 59 
METHODS OF ANALYSIS ........................................................................................................................... 60 
STRUCTURAL CHANGE...................................................................................................................... 60 
FUTURES MARKET USE .................................................................................................................... 65 
FARM SECTOR .................................................................................................................................. 66 
DATA ........................................................................................................................................................ 68 
FUNDAMENTAL ANALYSIS.................................................................................................................. 69 
FUTURES MARKET ANALYSIS .............................................................................................................. 69 
FARM INCOME SENSITIVITY................................................................................................................ 70 
 
CHAPTER 5 – RESULTS ......................................................................................................................... 71 
STRUCTURAL CHANGE .............................................................................................................................. 71 
ACREAGE ANALYSIS.......................................................................................................................... 72 
PRICE TO SUPPLY RATIO .................................................................................................................. 79 
STOCKS TO USE RATIO....................................................................................................................... 83 
ENDING STOCKS AND PRICE ............................................................................................................. 87 
CORN SUPPLY, DEMAND AND PRICE................................................................................................... 88 
SEGREGATED USE AND PRICE ........................................................................................................... 90 
FUTURES MARKET SURVEY RESULTS........................................................................................................ 91 
 
 
viii
CHANGES TO FARMER INCOME ................................................................................................................. 96 
 
CHAPTER 6 – CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................ 100 
SUMMARY ............................................................................................................................................... 100 
IMPLICATIONS ......................................................................................................................................... 101 
 
REFLECTIONS ....................................................................................................................................... 105 
WORKS CITED ....................................................................................................................................... 106 
SUPPORTING LITERATURE............................................................................................................... 112 
APPENDIX A – COMMODITY BROKERS SURVEY ....................................................................... 117 
APPENDIX B – DATA TABLES............................................................................................................ 121 
APPENDIX C – CORN PRODUCTION BUDGET.............................................................................. 126 
 
 
 
ix
FIGURES AND TABLES PAGE NUMBERS 
CHAPTER 2 – BIOFUELS BACKGROUND AND ETHANOL POLICY ............................................ 7 
FIGURE 1. CORN ETHANOL PRODUCTION AND RFS MANDATES (1980-2015) .............................................. 8 
TABLE 1.  RENEWABLE FUELS STANDARD 2005........................................................................................ 12 
TABLE 2.  RENEWABLE FUELS STANDARD 2007 TO 2022........................................................................... 13 
CHAPTER 3 – LITERATURE REVIEW................................................................................................ 24 
FIGURE 2.  SHARE OF CORN CROP USED FOR ETHANOL .............................................................................. 39 
FIGURE 3.  MONTHLY OIL AND CORN PRICE ............................................................................................... 46 
CHAPTER 4 – THEORETICAL DISCUSSION, METHODS OF ANALYSIS AND DATA............. 52 
FIGURE 4.  THEORETICAL CHANGES IN SUPPLY, DEMAND  AND COSTS ...................................................... 54 
CHAPTER 5 – RESULTS ......................................................................................................................... 71 
FIGURE 5.  MONTHLY AVERAGE CORN FUTURES PRICE FOR NEARBY CONTRACT OCT 1998 TO FEB 2009 ... 72 
TABLE 3.  TEN CROP ACREAGE CHANGES 1996-2008 ................................................................................ 73 
TABLE 4.  ACREAGE SHIFTS IN CORN 1996 - 2008 ...................................................................................... 74 
FIGURE 6.  CORN PRICE AND PLANTINGS 1996-2008 ................................................................................. 76 
FIGURE 7.  CHANGES BETWEEN CORN,  SOYBEANS AND COTTON ACRES 1996-2008................................... 77 
TABLE 5.   PLANTED ACREAGE SHIFTS IN CORN, SOYBEANS AND COTTON 1996-2008 ................................ 78 
TABLE 6.   PLANTED ACREAGE SHIFTS IN WHEAT 1996-2008 ..................................................................... 78 
FIGURE 8.  CORN PRICE TO SUPPLY RATIO 1970-2008 ............................................................................... 80 
FIGURE 9.  SOYBEAN PRICE TO SUPPLY RATIO 1970-2008 ......................................................................... 81 
FIGURE 10.  WHEAT PRICE TO SUPPLY RATIO 1970-2008 ........................................................................... 83 
FIGURE 11.  CORN STOCKS TO USE RATIO VS. PRICE 1970-2008 ................................................................. 84 
FIGURE 12.  SOYBEANS STOCKS TO USE RATIO VS. PRICE 1970-2008 ......................................................... 85 
FIGURE 13.  WHEAT STOCKS TO USE RATIO VS. PRICE 1970-2008 .............................................................. 86 
FIGURE 14.  ESTIMATED RELATIONSHIP ENDING STOCKS VS. PRICE OF CORN ............................................. 87 
TABLE 7.  MEAN SQUARE ERROR FOR PREDICTING CORN PRICE FROM ENDING STOCKS ............................. 88 
TABLE 8.  REGRESSION RESULTS FOR PREDICTING THE PRICE OF CORN ..................................................... 89 
FIGURE 15.  CORN USES VS. PRICE 1980-2008 ........................................................................................... 90 
FIGURE 16.  NET RETURN PER ACRE FOR CORN .......................................................................................... 97 
 
 
 
 
 
1
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
When governments intervene in the market place, there are almost always 
unforeseen and unintended consequences.  The unintended consequences from minor 
intervention into a specific commodity market may be contained within that commodity 
market.  However, when the intervention fundamentally alters the supply of or demand 
for a commodity, the unforeseen and unintended consequence may not only be observed 
within that commodity but may also be present in a number of other closely related 
commodity markets, and in some cases may even spill over into other somewhat 
unrelated markets.  The overall objective of this thesis is to examine the economic 
consequences of a major government intervention into a specific commodity market. 
During the decade of the 1960’s, US farmers received just over $1 per bushel for 
corn.  Corn exports increased substantially in the early 1970’s and by the middle of that 
decade farmers were receiving on average over $2.50 per bushel for corn.  However, in 
the 30 year period from 1976-2005 corn prices remained relatively stable, averaging 
$2.35 per bushel over that time frame.  There were only two years that the annual price of 
corn for a marketing year was more than $0.50 per bushel higher than the average and 
there were only two years when the marketing year average price was less than $0.50 per 
bushel lower than that average.   
During those 30 years, corn farmers saw a fairly steady increase in demand for 
corn: feed seed and industrial use rose from less than a billion bushels annually to nearly 
three billion bushels; feed usage increased from four billion to six billion bushels; and 
exports remained level varying around 1.8 billion bushel.  Why did prices remain stable 
over those 30 years when usage increased from seven to eleven billion bushels annually?  
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The answer is that corn yield increased sufficiently to supply the increasing usage.  In 
1976 the expected national average corn yield was about 90 bushels per acre and by 2005 
it had increased to over 140 bushels per acre.  Farmers have been the victims of racing on 
their own technological treadmill to improve yield and cut cost per bushel. The result, as 
economic theory would predict for a perfectly competitive market, is that the price of 
corn has remained close to the break-even cost to produce corn for most producers.  
Meanwhile, the world’s hunger for fossil based fuels has grown to extraordinary 
levels. The theory of peak oil has also been a concern for many groups and has spurred 
the relentless search for a so-called renewable fuel source in order to perpetuate the 
availability of energy to man and industry. 
And finally, increasing concerns about global climate change have pressured 
special interests and governments to seek a means of minimizing the impacts of human 
consumption of resources. In many schools of thought, man’s consumption of resources 
and specifically fossil based fuels, emits unsustainable levels of greenhouse gases (GHG) 
into the atmosphere, which leads to uncontrollable climate change. These scientists argue 
that in order to maintain a sustainable planet and end environmental injury, GHG 
emissions must be reduced to natural or even a net negative level.  
In the last few years, the US government has responded by creating legislation in 
response to lobbying pressure from corn growers wanting a higher price for their grain; 
anti-oil lobbying wanting to reduce our dependence on oil, particularly foreign oil; and 
environmental lobbying pressure to reduce our emissions of GHG.  While this legislation 
has shown up in a number of different places, two key pieces of legislation have been the 
Energy Policy Act of 2005 and the Energy Security and Independence Act (EISA) of 
 
 
3
December 2007.  These two pieces of legislation created federal mandates for the amount 
of US produced, corn based ethanol that must be blended into our national gasoline.  This 
created a federally mandated increase in demand for corn to be used to meet the ethanol 
requirements. 
Objectives 
 The overall objective of this thesis is to evaluate the direct economic impacts of 
the US ethanol industry on the US corn industry and to also document some of the 
unintended economic consequences in the corn industry and other agricultural industries.  
The three specific objectives are to: 
1. determine if there has been a structural change in the supply, demand and 
price relationship in the corn industry; 
2. determine if commodity brokers believe that the futures market is still 
effective tool manage price risk for their clients; and  
3. determine how farm profitability and risk have changed as a result of  ethanol 
policy with its intended and unintended consequences. 
Methods 
The core of this thesis is to delve into the economic law of unintended 
consequences. In one way or another, the extents to which the objectives of ethanol have 
been met are superficially observed on a day to day basis. The economic effects of corn 
ethanol at the farm level can be roughly identified, the energy issues can be weighed and 
the environmental impact can be measured. But a deeper analysis may reveal that ethanol 
has effects which reach much further than these segments of society. Since the rapid 
expansion of ethanol, agricultural markets have experienced volatility which had not been 
 
 
4
previously observed. Farm and futures prices reached unforeseen levels and these 
markets now seem to be tied to external markets more than ever.  
Ethanol demand for corn has been the greatest single economic factor to impact 
agriculture in many decades. Since the inception of the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) 
risk patterns have changed, volatility has increased and participation in the major trading 
centers has changed. With all of these changes, higher prices than have ever been 
observed have come to pass in the commodity markets and may or may not be explained 
by the traditional fundamental and technical factors. This paper explores the extent to 
which structural change has occurred and the extent to which these changes are tied to 
diverting capital and resources to biofuel production. Current primary and secondary data 
are used to at least partially explain the associations of these changes to biofuel. The 
primary focus of this study is how these market conditions relate to corn ethanol, as this 
is the most prominent biofuel currently. 
Thesis Organization 
Following this introductory chapter, the next chapter will be a brief introduction 
and background on the foundations of the ethanol industry. The first parts will review the 
preceding legislative initiatives which led to the current policies as well as an overview of 
the current U.S. biofuel policy. Following is an overview of the industry as it stands at 
the time of this writing. Some simple statistics are given in order to visualize the makeup 
of market participants and ethanol consumers. In order to understand many of the terms 
related to corn ethanol issues, it is helpful to have reviewed this chapter before 
continuing. 
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In Chapter 3, a thorough review of current academic, government and industry 
publications is given. A plethora of research has been done on issues related to corn 
ethanol and its various impacts on economics, culture and the environment. Research on 
some of these areas is limited, but an attempt is made to present all the topics which are 
tied to ethanol production including the arguments made by both supporters and 
opponents of corn ethanol. 
Chapter 4 consists of a theoretical discussion about structural change. The 
ramifications that the economy might expect to go through from such an imposing 
artificial demand as the corn ethanol mandates are analyzed. It is followed by the 
methods of analysis used to achieve the objectives and a brief description of the data 
used. 
Chapter 5 is a compilation of the results from testing the economic theories 
related to ethanol production. The results will follow an outline similar to the objectives 
laid out above. Namely, there will be a fundamental analysis of acreage shifts, pricing 
changes and ethanol production from the corn supply of each year. Secondly, a survey of 
country futures brokers is presented to qualitatively measure how the trading markets 
have changed since the ethanol mandates have been put into place. Finally, the effects on 
the costs and returns of farmers after the shocks of ethanol are analyzed. Chapter 6 
consists of my conclusions and implications for various market participants. I will reflect 
on what has been presented throughout the entirety of this thesis. 
U.S. biofuel policy and its impacts on economic markets are complex and 
significant. The reason why so much literature has been issued relating to ethanol is that 
the topics of impact are seemingly endless. It is certainly difficult to objectively measure 
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any of these changes but it is expedient to start with a basic, fundamental analysis before 
drawing any conclusions regarding any one ethanol issue. The whole story must be told 
and this is intent of this thesis. 
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Chapter 2 – Biofuels Background and Ethanol Policy 
At times the energy, political and rural economic sectors have been at odds with 
each other but are cooperating for the common goal of replacing fossil fuels with 
biofuels. Biofuels are defined by Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary as “a fuel (as 
wood or ethanol) composed of or produced from raw materials.” Biofuels are different 
from fossil fuels in that they are produced from recently dead organic materials as 
opposed to fossilized hydrocarbons like oil or gas. 
Biofuels are generally converted from organic material into either ethanol or bio-
diesel. Biodiesel is derived from vegetable oils like palm oil or soybean oil and refined to 
a combustible form for automobiles. Ethanol is either derived from fermentation of 
starchy goods like potatoes or grain, or from the cellulose in the other portions of plants 
like wood, leaves and stems. The viability of each of these as an energy source ranges 
according to each product and the technology used to produce them.. For example, 
outside of economic conditions, the net energy balance (NEB) of cellulosic ethanol is 
negative due to currently inefficient technologies. But altogether, biofuels continue to 
gain prominence on the world stage as an answer to the challenges in the introduction.  
The most prevalent of biofuels in the United States today is ethanol produced 
from grain corn. The refining capacity for corn ethanol is expected to reach 13.5 billion 
gallons in 2009. This is an increase from only 2.1 billion gallons in 2002.  
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Figure 1. Corn Ethanol Production and RFS Mandates (1980-2015) 
 
Source: Renewable Fuels Association, Environmental Protection Agency 
 
Figure 1 is an illustration of this growth. The trend has largely been supported through 
legislation and subsidies from the government which initiated the first pro-ethanol 
mandates in 2002. The U.S. congress and supporting industry groups have cited the 
challenges outlined at the opening of this paper as imperatives for moving toward corn-
based ethanol. The legislation has since grown to include other biofuels such as biodiesel 
and especially cellulosic ethanol, but current applies most directly to corn based ethanol. 
By debatable measure, the expanded production and use of corn ethanol has 
achieved its goals of stimulating agricultural markets, reducing dependence on foreign 
and fossil fuels and putting downward pressure GHG emissions. Extensive literature has 
been published regarding these issues. The current available store of academic research is 
vast in its approach to biofuels from the perspective of agricultural, energy and 
environmental economics. In some cases a general scientific consensus has been met 
regarding the merits of corn ethanol. In other cases, the table is open for debate.  
 
2002 Farm Bill
2005 RFS 
2007 RFS
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Policy and Legislation 
It is vital to have a general understanding of the evolution of biofuel policies and 
current legislation supporting ethanol use. Ethanol has been produced from corn since the 
early 1980s but only entered the public arena in 1992. The policy regarding ethanol has 
changed from exploration as a fuel additive to that of fuel replacer. While industry groups 
have lobbied congress for years to expand ethanol production, government agencies have 
been reluctant until recently to authorize active government support for the ethanol 
industry. Today, the United States government supports ethanol use through subsidies, 
blending mandates and capital expenditure guarantees.  
Energy is the newest portion of farm legislation first appearing in agricultural 
policy in the 1990 farm bill. This is also the first time energy was directly linked to 
agriculture. The Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act of 1990 was also one of 
the first pieces of legislation to address global climate change. In fact, this was an 
important enough item that it gained a section title in the 1990 bill. Contained within this 
section was a program created to fund “biomass energy demonstration projects.” These 
demonstration projects were established to support research in developing energy from 
renewable and domestic sources. The demonstration projects were organized to stimulate 
interest in biofuels as a viable replacement for conventional energy. 
 The next major support for ag-based energy development was organized in the 
2002 farm bill. This time, energy was important enough to have its own title and section 
dedicated to it. This legislation further funded research in biofuels and expanded its reach 
to include hydrogen and fuel cell technologies. The provisions of the 2002 farm bill 
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energy policy were limited to funding research but would give rise to a focus on 
developing a sustainable bioenergy sector. 
 By 2005 enough interest in biofuels and specifically ethanol had been generated 
that congress chose to actively integrate them into the nation’s energy supplies. The first 
major step in the process of creating a viable bioenergy sector was the Energy Policy Act 
of 2005. Most of this act was focused on developing other-than-bio sources of energy 
such as nuclear and solar power. But as part of this legislation the RFS was first 
established which set mandates for the amount of biofuels to be used as energy linked to 
timetables. The RFS put biofuels at the forefront of alternative energy development. It 
also authorized the first subsidy for fuel refiners who blend ethanol with conventional 
gasoline.  There has been a form of subsidy to refiners since 1978, when they started to 
receive a waiver for a portion of the gas taxes for ethanol blended gasoline.    
 On December 19, 2007, President Bush signed the Energy Independence and 
Security Act into Law. This legislation built on the previous bills and directed more 
public resources toward developing the biofuels industry. The keystone of this law was 
the expansion of the RFS. Initially, the RFS stipulated that 7.5 billion gallons of corn 
ethanol be produced and blended by 2012 with an additional 250 million gallons coming 
from non-corn biomass from 2012 onward (see figure 1). But the 2007 bill grew the RFS 
to a total of 36 billion gallons of ethanol by 2022, 15 of which would be derived from 
corn. A more detailed explanation of the RFS can be found below. 
 Finally in 2008, the aptly named Food, Conservation and Energy Act of 2008 
(italics added) irreversibly linked the energy sector with agriculture. Funding in the 2008 
farm bill has expanded to guarantee loans for ethanol refineries, expand research efforts, 
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support biomass production and many other provisions. Although this law is directly tied 
to the Energy policy of 2007, it is technically the current and periodic farm bill 
legislation. What this means is that the biofuel supporting law in the Farm Bill is in 
addition to the energy legislation of 2007. 
 The cumulative legislation related to biofuels and ethanol has amassed a great 
deal of public attention and governmental complexity. But most of it can be categorized 
into three basic areas: Blending mandates through the RFS, subsidies and loan guarantees 
(financing) and exploration. Below a broad overview of each of these categories is given 
in order to more fully understand the role of government in the development of the 
ethanol industry as it stands today. 
Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS)  
 Some confusion exists surrounding the concept of the RFS. Many perceive it to be 
a production mandate. While it mimics the attributes of a production floor, it is actually a 
blending mandate meant to obligate transportation fuel refiners to blend a minimum 
volume of ethanol and biodiesel into the domestic energy supply. Additionally, it is more 
of a moving target than a fixed standard. There is no mandate that ethanol be produced. 
There is, however, an EPA mandated blending wall which stipulates a blending ceiling of 
10% for conventional vehicles. But combined with fuel for flex-fuel vehicles, there is 
virtually no limit to the cumulative amount of ethanol which can be blended. 
 The RFS was first introduced in 2005 as a guideline of benchmarks for the nation 
to reach each year over time, to finally achieve a goal of a certain level of biofuel use. 
This first version of the RFS was quite timid compared to the 2007 modification of the 
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standard. Table 1 outlines the phase-in of biofuels as legislated by the RFS. It was quite 
simple and, in fact, was limited to mandating corn ethanol usage levels.  
 
  Table 1 – Renewable Fuel Standard 2005 
Year Renewable Fuels (Corn Ethanol) 
2006 4.0 
2007 4.7 
2008 5.4 
2009 6.1 
2010 6.8 
2011 7.4 
2012 7.5 
  Source: Environmental Protection Agency 
 
But in 2007, the current version of RFS was expanded to include more varieties of 
biofuels. Not only was the goal for corn ethanol usage increased, but the new RFS 
includes the mandatory blending of cellulosic ethanol and biodiesel. Additionally, the 
new RFS differentiates the types of biofuels and classifies them by assigning a status 
related to their actual GHG emissions and energy values. The current RFS is summarized 
in Table 2.  
The most notable differences between 2005 and the current version of the 
standard are obviously the volumes mandated and the timeline of commitment to biofuel 
use. The newest version has committed the United States to increasing ethanol usage at 
least through 2022 with the aim of replacing up to 25% of the nations transportation fuels 
with domestically sourced ethanol. Further discussion regarding the effectiveness of this 
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policy in reaching these goals can be found in later chapters. There is an especially large 
deficit in current literature regarding the tolerance of current automobile profile and  
Table  2 – Renewable Fuel Standard 2007 - 2022 
Year Corn 
Ethanol 
Advanced 
Biofuel* 
Cellulosic 
Biofuel 
Bio-mass 
Based 
Diesel 
Undifferentiated 
Advanced 
Biofuel** 
Total 
RFS 
2008 9.0     9.0 
2009 10.5 .6  .5 .1 11.1 
2010 12.0 .95 .1 .65 .2 12.95 
2011 12.6 1.35 .25 .8 .3 13.95 
2012 13.2 2 .5 1 .5 15.2 
2013 13.8 2.75 1  1.75 16.55 
2014 14.4 3.75 1.75  2 18.15 
2015 15 5.5 3  2.5 20.5 
2016 15 7.25 4.25  3 22.25 
2017 15 9 5.5  3.5 24 
2018 15 11 7  4 26 
2019 15 13 8.5  4.5 28 
2020 15 15 10.5  4.5 30 
2021 15 18 13.5  4.5 33 
2022 15 21 16  5 36 
Source: Renewable Fuels Association, Environmental Protection Agency 
* =Derived from renewable sources other than corn starch which reduce GHG emissions by 50% 
compared to conventional gasoline 
**=Must reduce GHG emissions by 60% 
 
infrastructure of various levels of ethanol in fuel. Ethanol is highly corrosive and by some 
estimates, 15% is the highest level which can be tolerated by current automobiles and 
fuel handling facilities. The question regarding how the nation’s transportation fleet will 
change is an urgent one. But today, the USDA is urging the EPA to raise the blending 
wall to support the industry.  
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It is crucial to understand the mechanism by which the RFS is implemented and 
enforced. I will reiterate here that the RFS is not a production mandate but rather a 
blending floor. It is set forth by congress and implemented as law. But the authority to 
oversee and implement the RFS is delegated to the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), which has some limited freedom in the way it carries out the process.  
Each year, national gasoline demand is projected by the U.S. Department of 
Energy. From this projection, a percentage is calculated of the total gasoline demand 
which would be required to meet the RFS. Then, according to the volume capacity of fuel 
refiners, they are assigned a Renewable Volume Obligation (RVO). Fuel refiners are 
required to demonstrate that they are in compliance with the RFS from year to year by 
tracking the volume which has been blended through identification numbers which were 
previously assigned to each “batch” of ethanol produced or imported. These Renewable 
Identification Numbers (RINs) are specific to an individual lot of ethanol which tracks its 
origin, volume and end destination. At the end of the refining year, the RINs are tallied 
and used to sum up the total volume of ethanol which was blended for that given year. 
Interestingly, these RINs carry more intrinsic value than a simple tracking device. 
They can also be traded at the market and substituted for meeting individual refiners’ 
RVO. For example, if refiner A has difficulty in meeting its assigned RVO for the year, it 
can purchase a surplus RIN from competing refiner B which may have surpassed its own 
RVO for the year. Finally, the RINs can actually be saved or traded for the next years 
RVO and subsequently count toward the national RFS. By decree the EPA allows up to 
20% of the following years RVO can be met by the current years RINs given the RVO at 
individual refiners has been surpassed. 
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Therefore it is very apparent that the RFS is not a cut and dry mandate for a 
sudden consumption of ethanol at a defined level from year to year. This insight provides 
a deeper conceptualization of the background in how the RFS affects the farm and 
agricultural economies. 
Financing 
Government has also extended its hand into the financing side of ethanol 
economics. On the supply side, investors are given the opportunity to share risk with the 
public through loan guarantees, grants and a guaranteed demand through the RFS. On the 
blending side, fuel refiners are given federal tax incentives and subsidies to use ethanol in 
their fuels. There are also many tax incentives at the state level, but these vary from state 
to state and are too numerous to expound upon here. It is sufficient to note here that 
individual states reduce the tax burden on refiners for blending ethanol at some level or 
another in addition to the federal support. Many states also offer different programs in the 
form of loan guarantees or tax credits for capital expenditures on ethanol processing 
plants. But the most significant subsidy is at the federal level and is universal across all 
states.  
The subsidy is the most straight-forward of the financing support. The formal 
name of this subsidy is the Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit (VEETC). The VEETC 
provides the funding to support ethanol production through creating a demand-side 
market for ethanol producers. The roots of the VEETC extend back to 1978 when ethanol 
was given an exemption from the fuel excise tax. The new version (VEETC) removes 
some of the prior restrictions for qualifying for the exemption such as blending limits. 
When the VEETC was first authorized, it refunded 51 cents per gallon of each gallon of 
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ethanol blended into gasoline. It was put into the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 
and is intended to last through 2010. In the 2008 Farm Bill, the VEETC was reduced to 
45 cents per gallon. The VEETC is larger ($1.01/gallon) for ethanol from advanced 
biofuels, such as cellulosic ethanol, but our main subject here is corn-based ethanol. 
It is estimated that $22 billion dollars will have been paid to refiners through the 
VEETC by the end of 2010. No analysis will be provided here regarding the net returns 
to the public by way of this tax credit, but considerable discussion could be generated if 
interests were directed to calculate those levels. Another intriguing aspect of the VEETC 
is the fact that it is set at a flat level and in no way tied to the profitability of ethanol 
production or blending. Common sense would dictate that if the VEETC were necessary 
to stimulate ethanol consumption, then the VEETC should fluctuate as the profitability of 
ethanol rises and falls. The necessary size of the VEETC to make ethanol consumption 
profitable would also provide an interesting topic for future research. 
The final support for the domestic ethanol industry is a protective import tariff on 
foreign-sourced ethanol. While this product is still subject to the same policies regarding 
RINs and is treated as an equivalent substance, imported ethanol faces a 54 cent per 
gallon tax until December 31, 2010. It was imposed to inhibit cheaper sources of ethanol 
available to refiners from places like Brazil, which is the world’s largest ethanol 
producer, from taking advantage of the VEETC. However, there is also a 2.5% ad 
valorem tariff charged for all imports. The import tariff has seen two extensions, the 
latest of which was in the 2008 farm bill adding two years to its implementation. 
On the supply side, financial incentives to produce ethanol amount to a degree of 
risk sharing by the public sector with private sector processors. If a market for ethanol 
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was previously a mirage, the demand has been established by the RFS. And while many 
investors may view the risk to benefit ratio too high for building a new ethanol plant, the 
government has also set aside funding in the form of loan guarantees and grants. 
Currently, grants are bestowed upon worthy projects which demonstrate the viability of 
advanced ethanol from biomass refining. Corn ethanol is included as well. Biorefinery 
Assistance Program ensures loan guarantees of up to 90% of principal and interest, not 
exceeding $250 million, for building new and modifying existing bio-refineries. These 
guarantees are subject to review on a project by project basis, but funding has been 
mandated in set-asides for this program through fiscal year 2012. 
New Bioenergy Development 
This review would not be complete without mentioning the support for 
developing new bioenergy sources. Corn ethanol is actually only the first and fastest 
growing segment of the biofuel industry. But corn ethanol only makes up 42% of the 
final year of the RFS. The other 58% is dedicated to coming from so-called advanced 
biofuels, which are produced from cellulosic sources such as wood waste and corn stover. 
Whereas in previous years, biofuel funding was directed to developing the corn ethanol 
industry, that research and development has been shifted in the direction of developing 
advanced biofuels. The commercial feasibility of these fuels is limited because of the 
inefficient chemical technologies which now exist to break the cellulosic bonds in plant 
materials. These chemical bonds must be broken down before the sugars can be 
fermented into ethanol. Therefore, the research and development funding has been 
aggressively placed into the pursuit of more efficient technologies. The funding for these 
programs have been articulated in many legislative bills, including the Bio-Based 
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Markets Program, the Bioenergy Program for Advanced Biofuels and the Biomass 
Research and Development Program. These are contained in the farm bill legislation of 
2008 but others have also been implemented through other avenues. 
Much of the support for ethanol has materialized into legislation. Whether or not 
this reflects the public sentiment toward ethanol is uncertain, but the legislation is so vast 
and so brawny, that it has a definitive impact on the ethanol industry. Regardless of the 
commercial feasibility of these ventures, the U.S. government has actively created a 
demand-side market for ethanol and propped up the supply side through risk sharing.  
The RFS creates a stable market for the fuel which may not be as predictable without the 
legislative supports. The VEETC which refiners enjoy also sets a premium on ethanol 
over other competitive fuel additives (note: ethanol is used as an octane enhancer and 
used to replace substances such as Methyl-tert-butyl-ether. This is discussed below). The 
import tariffs also protect the domestic industry.  The effects of these policies on the 
feasibility of the ethanol industry will be discussed in a later chapter, but future research 
might be directed toward analyzing the stand-alone viability of the U.S. ethanol industry 
without these financial and market supports. 
U.S. Energy Use 
In 2007, the United States consumed more than 100 quadrillion BTUs of energy 
from all sources (EIA, 2008). Of this, only 7 percent was produced from domestic 
renewable sources. Energy sources considered to be renewable include solar, 
hydroelectric, geothermal, wind and biomass. Of all renewable energy produced in 2007, 
biomass accounted for 53%. This equates to approximately 3.7% of the nation’s total 
energy supply being derived from biomass. Energy produced from biomass in primarily 
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converted into transportation fuels. Although a small portion is devoted to electricity 
production, most is used to produce transportation fuels in the form of ethanol or 
biodiesel. The majority of biomass converted into biofuels is produced from the 
conversion of corn starch to ethanol. In 2008 a record 9.2 billion gallons of ethanol were 
produced, primarily from corn, representing less than 1% of all energy consumed and 
about 5% of gasoline consumption (EIA, 2007). On the other hand, nearly 23% of the 
2007 13.1 billion bushel corn crop was used for ethanol production (RFA, 2008). This is 
compared to 1.1 billion bushels used in 2002/2003 of a 9.5 billion bushel corn crop which 
is roughly11.5%.  
Ethanol Production 
Ethanol is generally categorized by the source from which it is produced; these 
two categories are corn ethanol and cellulosic ethanol. Currently, the majority of ethanol 
is produced from the starches in corn kernels. However, a large amount of research is 
being devoted to developing technologies which can efficiently convert cellulose, 
hemicelluloses and lignin into simple carbohydrates for further conversion into ethanol. 
The presumed benefits of this so-called cellulosic ethanol is that dependence on corn 
grain for fuel is reduced by using crop residues and other waste such as corn stover and 
straw. In addition, alternative crops are being considered as potentially efficient supplies 
of ethanol such as switchgrass, poplar trees (Steeves, 2006) and many others. The RFS 
stipulates that at least 21 of the 36 billion gallons of renewable fuel be derived from 
cellulosic and other sources while 15 billion gallons be derived from corn (RFA, 2008). 
Altogether the total production capacity of the industry is 12.3 billion gallons and will 
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continue to increase to meet the RFS. It is expected to increase to 13.5 billion gallons by 
the end of 2009. 
Currently, commercial ethanol is produced from corn in one of two processes: wet 
milling or dry milling. Most of the 178 ethanol plants presently in operation use dry mill 
processes (ACE, 2008). In the wet milling process, corn is soaked in sulfuric acid to 
assist the separation of the kernels into the individual components comprised of the germ, 
gluten and starch. The germ is then separated and used as the source of oil extraction. The 
remaining starch and gluten goes through an additional separation process which frees 
each part from each other. The starch is then processed into various products or 
fermented into ethanol. The resulting products from the wet mill process are corn oil 
(from the germ), dry gluten meal and ethanol. Corn gluten meal is used as a feed 
ingredient for poultry production.  
Dry milling is dedicated to producing ethanol and results in various byproducts. 
This is in contrast to wet milling whereas the results are three co-products of corn. With 
regard to ethanol production, therefore, dry milling is considered to be much more 
efficient than wet-milling which is the reason that dry milling is the industry standard 
today. In dry milling, the corn is immediately ground into flour without separation of the 
individual parts. The meal is then mixed with water and a blend of enzymes which 
decompose the starches into dextrose which is a simple carbohydrate. The slurry is heated 
to reduce bacteria in the mix then cooled before having yeast added for fermentation. 
After 48 hours, the alcohol is distilled out of the mash and concentrated to 190 proof and 
further dehydrated to reach a 200 proof level (100% alcohol). When the alcohol is 
distilled out, the remaining stillage is eventually processed and dried to produce dried 
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distillers grains with solubles (DDGS). DDGS is considered to be a highly desirable feed 
component in livestock rations because of its high protein and energy value. In the most 
recent reports, dry milling has achieved a conversion rate of approximately 2.7 gallons of 
ethanol per bushel of corn with 17 pounds of by-product remaining in the form of DDGS. 
Ethanol is a highly competitive industry with a five firm ratio of 41% and a ten 
firm ratio of 51% in terms of present production capacity (RFA, 2008). Large diversified 
corporations such as Archer Daniels Midland Company (ADM) have entered the market 
as well as numerous specialty producers. Currently 22 plants are under construction and 
are expected to add an additional 2.2 billion gallons in capacity. In December 2008, RFA 
listed 132 separate ethanol producing firms with a current capacity of 12.3 billion gallons 
and a future capacity of 13.5 billion gallons when plants under construction were 
included.  
Ethanol Consumption 
Ethanol demand has expanded rapidly in the past 5 years. Due to the government 
mandated RFS, fuel refiners are required to blend increasing amounts of ethanol into 
gasoline. The VEETC of $0.45 per gallon of ethanol used has supported blending in 
proportions of up to 10%. This fuel mixture, called E10, is safe for use in all vehicles 
currently in the United States (ACE, 2008). At this level, ethanol increases the fuel 
mixture’s octane rating as well as engine performance. The reason ethanol was initially 
introduced as an octane booster was to replace the outdated Methyl-tertiary-butyl-ether 
(MTBE) which has been shown to be highly pollutant to air and groundwater supplies 
(Duffield, 2006). At levels higher than 10%, ethanol becomes highly corrosive to 
conventional engines and reduces fuel efficiency. 
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Vehicles which can run on higher blends of ethanol are available. The most 
common ratio is E85 where 85% of the fuel is ethanol and the remaining 15% is 
conventional gasoline. These vehicles are called Flex-Fuel Vehicles (FFVs) because they 
are capable of running on fuel blends as high as E85 or as low as E10. The parts are 
specially manufactured to be highly resistant to the corrosive nature of ethanol. There 
were approximately 297 thousand FFVs in use in 2006 compared to 179 thousand in 
2003 (EIA, 2008). This number is expected to increase as car manufacturers address the 
growing demand. EIA estimated that in 2007, 1.27 million FFVs would be “made 
available” to the nation. Despite the growing number of FFVs on the road, the 
substitutability of ethanol for gasoline is limited. The National Ethanol Vehicle Coalition 
(NEVC) estimates there are a total of about 1860 locations which offer E85 in 44 States. 
However, 71% of these locations are concentrated in the Midwest and in just 10 states. 
Minnesota alone accounts for 356 of the E85 stations counted in the national total 
(NEVC, 2008). One reason for the limited availability of E85% is that it must be 
transported by individual trucks or train cars specifically suited for the corrosive nature of 
this blend. E85 cannot be transported via pipeline like conventional gasoline. 
Because the ethanol is still in its infancy, it faces many challenges in the future to 
remain viable. One of the key issues relating to the growth of the industry is the ability of 
the current infrastructure to cope with the increasing volumes and proposed increased 
blending rates. Significant capital will have to be spent on specialized rail cars, tanker 
trucks, car engine parts and even the components used in fuel pumps at gas stations. 
There will also be the issue of a sustainable supply base. Although I will briefly address 
this topic in the next chapter, the question should be asked if a sustainable supply or corn 
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crop can be produced to meet the 15 billion gallon portion of the RFS on an ongoing 
basis. It may be possible to supply the 5.5 billion bushels of corn, but what is given up as 
a result? 
At the time of this writing, there is also a contractionary change taking place 
within the industry. The collapse of the U.S. economy and crude oil prices has strained 
the economic value of ethanol to refiners. This has led to numerous plants idling and/or 
declaring bankruptcy. An inability to generate cash flow and/or to pay down principal on 
capital expenditures has incapacitated at least 20-25 plants and has contributed to the 
halting of operations on plants under construction. This includes the bankruptcy of the 
largest ethanol producer firm, Versasun, which was forced to shut the doors at its 17 
ethanol plants in November 2008. 
What is unique to the ethanol industry is the role it has played in expanding the 
demand side for the U.S. corn supply. In just 5 years, the industry has grown from 
utilizing 1 billion bushels of corn, about 10% of production to utilizing 23% of the largest 
corn crop in history. It has single-handedly shifted the demand curve outward to such a 
degree as has not been observed in history. In the coming years it will continue to play 
perhaps the most prominent role in grain marketing compared to any other channel of the 
agricultural sector. 
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Chapter 3 - Literature Review 
Agricultural markets in the United States have experienced unprecedented 
changes since 2005. While exogenous factors such as economic trends, oil prices and 
others have all influenced these changes, none is as significant as the Renewable Fuel 
Standard (RFS) initially signed into law in 2005. By so creating such a large artificial 
demand for fuel ethanol as stipulated by the RFS, the government has sought to achieve 
certain goals while the law of unintended consequences has been observed. The first 
introductory sentence in FAPRI’s Model of the U.S. Ethanol Market states (FAPRI, June 
2008, p3): 
The United States ethanol market has become an epicenter of shocks to 
agricultural commodity markets and a focal point of farm policy that 
defies precise quantitative analysis. 
This purpose of this chapter is to explore and analyze the arguments noted by the 
antagonists and proponents of ethanol production from corn. Current literature is 
reviewed to articulate these arguments and implicitly explain whether or not the goals of 
the ethanol mandates are being achieved. Other issues are also addressed by referencing 
academic, government and industry literature. 
The extensive market for ethanol today in the United States would not exist 
without the RFS formulated by the federal government of the United States. It is valid to 
state that ethanol was in production long before the mandates of 2005, but the majority of 
ethanol from corn was used for industrial purposes and its production was driven by open 
market forces. But many industry groups contest that the benefits of ethanol far outweigh 
the costs. 
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The Renewable Fuels Association exists to “[promote] policies, regulations and 
research and development initiatives that will lead to the increased production and use of 
fuel ethanol (RFA, 2008).” The association represents the majority of investors and other 
stakeholders who have a vested interest in the expansion of ethanol markets. They are 
also the most prevalent and reasoned representatives of the ethanol industry. The RFA 
provides numerous reasons why ethanol is beneficial. The reasons they cite as benefits 
realized from ethanol use are environmental impacts, energy security, reduction of fuel 
costs for consumers, boosting the economy and stimulating farmer income (RFA, 2009).  
Energy Contribution of Ethanol 
Energy security as a priority in the United States has gained increasing attention 
and support due to rising crude oil prices and escalating turmoil in oil-rich regions of the 
world. Biofuels have been viewed not only as a cheap alternative to oil-based fuels, but 
also as a means of securing energy independence. An important key to understanding the 
potential for biofuels to contribute to energy independence and the role which ethanol 
might play is the net energy balance of ethanol production. 
A variety of studies have been performed to estimate the net energy balance of 
corn based ethanol since the late 1980s. Despite the number of studies performed, a wide 
range of results have been produced and therefore no general consensus has been reached 
on the matter. For example, Ho estimated the net energy balance of corn ethanol at 
around 4000 British Thermal Units (BTUs) per gallon in 1989. This is compared to an 
estimate of -33,562 BTUs per gallon by Pimental in 2001. Yet another study estimated 
the energy balance at 30,589 BTUs per gallon (Lorez, 1995). The results from these 
specific studies roughly represent the outcome from other related studies.  
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A study aimed at establishing the true Net Energy Value (NEV) of ethanol in 
2002 indicates that discrepancies between the studies are probably a result of using 
“various assumptions about farm production and ethanol conversion (USDA, 2002).” 
Furthermore, USDA notes that previous research may have been done using different 
data from changing time periods. In the same study, USDA attempts to address each of 
these issues and accurately estimate the NEV of ethanol. The result was a positive NEV 
of 21,105 BTUs per gallon of ethanol. 
What sets the USDA study apart from others is the use of an expansive dataset for 
their calculations which is compiled from the nine highest corn and ethanol producing 
states. Their methods employ weighted and moving averages throughout. In contrast, the 
other studies generally use data from specific locations and a specific set of localized 
criteria for corn and ethanol production. While the USDA study considered the factors 
which create the variability between studies, the individual estimates may be more 
accurate for estimating NEV in individual localities and production chains.  
Therefore, it may be implicitly inaccurate to state whether or not corn ethanol 
exhibits a positive NEV based on a given set of assumptions. Where NEV is critical to 
the argument of whether or not corn ethanol contributes to domestic energy security, the 
only way to answer this point is to take a national accounting of ethanol production thus 
far and estimate what the NEV of current and past ethanol production is. Only then can 
we truly know if dependence oil-based fuels has been reduced and to what extent.  
A critical point regarding the energy security contributed by corn ethanol is that 
of the potential for corn to displace current and expected fuel consumption of traditional 
fuels. A popular way of assailing this case is to describe how much ethanol could be 
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produced if every acre in the U.S. was dedicated to corn production. A more realistic 
perspective may be to estimate the amount of ethanol which could be produced from 
current corn yields since these are at all time historic highs. 
In 2008, the United States corn crop amounted to 12.02 billion bushels (NASS, 
2009), a drop of over 7% from 2007. Using the most recent and highest conversion rate 
of 2.7 gallons per bushel (www.ethanolmarket.com) there is a potential production of 
33.66 billion gallons of ethanol from 12 billion bushels of corn. In 2007 the U.S. 
consumed over 140 billion gallons of gasoline (EIA, 2009). If all of the potential ethanol 
were blended into gasoline, roughly 24% of gasoline consumed today would be 
displaced. However, this notion is wholly unrealistic. It is based on the assumption that 
the entire U.S. corn crop at current levels would be devoted to ethanol production at the 
expense of all other domestic demand. The RFS also does not stipulate that in the future 
all ethanol should be derived from corn. The mandate is that a maximum of 15 billion 
gallons be converted from corn when the RFS matures. Even if the conversion ration 
were improved to 3 gallons per bushel, it will still require 5 billion bushels of corn to 
meet which would represent about 38% of the corn crop in the record crop marketing 
year 2007 (NASS, 2009). These levels would be equivalent to about 12% of domestic 
gasoline consumption being displaced by a domestic source of energy. 
But if we return to the idea of an NEV for ethanol, this amount of energy security 
achieved is vague at best. The best USDA estimate of an energy ratio for a dry milling 
operation is 1.11 for corn to ethanol conversion. This would imply that a mere 11% net 
benefit is realized in terms of energy from ethanol due to the energy inputs required to 
make it. From a 15 billion gallon production level, we can then infer that nearly 13.5 
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billion gallon equivalents of energy were used to produce the alternative, leaving a net 
displacement of the energy equivalent to 1.5 billion gallons of ethanol. Adjusting the total 
impact on energy security, we arrive at a 1.05% reduction of dependence on energy from 
sources other than ethanol (i.e. crude oil products, etc.) while at the same time nearly 
doubling the energy consumption in pursuit of corn ethanol. Appropriately, Carriquiry, 
Hayes and Rubin (2008), show that energy security is more efficiently attained by 
investing in an alternative such as green coal technology. 
Environmental Impacts 
In contrast to the issue of net energy balance, there seems to be some agreement 
on the GHG emissions of ethanol when used as transportation fuel. In a life-cycle 
analysis, ethanol production and combustion may reduce GHG by as much of 88% 
compared to the energy equivalent of gasoline (Hill et al., 2006). Measuring directly, 
Wang (2005) reports that ethanol blends of 85% ethanol and 15% gasoline (E85) emit up 
to 23% less GHG than pure gasoline in flex-fuel vehicles. Furthermore, the more 
common blend of E10 was reported to emit up to 2% less GHG than regular gasoline.  
However, the GHG considerations extend beyond ethanol as a fuel. The 
production of ethanol seems to increase GHG overall due to land use changes. Babcock, 
Feng and Rubin (2008) show a 35% increase in GHG emissions from corn production 
when cropland is used to grow successive corn crops. Typically, corn is grown in rotation 
with soybeans, reducing the need for additional fertilizer applications. But most of the 
expanded corn crop is being produced in succession on cultivated lands (Babcock, 2008). 
In addition, although proper cultivation practices can aid in sequestering GHG from the 
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atmosphere into the soil (Hill, 2006) poor production practices can actually lead to the 
release of additional GHG into the atmosphere (Brenner et al., 2001). 
When evaluating the environmental impact of ethanol beyond GHG emissions, 
the effects are complex and extensive. In a working paper commissioned by The World 
Bank, it is pointed out that biofuel-related impacts on the environment include issues 
such as increased soil erosion, reduced water quality, increased resource diversion and 
chemical contamination from expanded use of pesticides and herbicides (Rajagopal and 
Zilberman, 2007).  
For example, Beckman, et.al. (2008) performed research on future land-use 
changes as a result of broad biofuel mandates. They predicted that by the year 2015 there 
would be a 9.8% increase in land used for corn production in the United States alone. A 
prediction of a 10.0% decrease in land used for production of other grains may imply a 
“shifting” of these crops to corn, but two practical issues arise. First, the major grain corn 
growing centers are agronomically distinct from the major growing centers of other 
grains. In the United States corn is grown in areas where it can be economically rotated 
with soybean production. But this same model actually predicts an increase in oilseed 
production generally. Secondly, the number of acres on which corn is grown in the 
United States represented approximately 33% of all cultivated land in 2005. This is 
compared to nearly 27% for wheat, barley and oats combined (ERS, 2008). The 
Beckman, et.al., study was done in 2008 at a time when corn acres had already been 
expanded by 6.3% to 87.3 million acres since 2005. 
This debate regarding the concept of land-use change has also now entered the 
public arena. On March 5, 2009, the California Environmental Protection Agency 
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(CEPA) Air Resources Board released a set of proposed legislation to implement 
California’s “low carbon standard.” In that document, ethanol from corn is actually 
tagged as releasing more CO2 than conventional gasoline. For every mega-joule of 
energy which gasoline releases, approximately 95 grams of carbon-dioxide is emitted. 
But in the case of corn ethanol, 69 grams are emitted from direct ethanol production, and 
an additional 30 grams from supposed land-use change (CEPA, 2009). At the time of this 
writing, there is also considerable debate taking place between the USDA and the EPA. 
The USDA would like to see the blending floor raised for refiners but the EPA is 
delaying a ruling on that issue to further explore the ideas of land-use change and the 
merits of life-cycle analysis (EPA, 2009). 
Although one bushel of corn will yield 2.7 gallons of ethanol, it requires 
anywhere from four to eight gallons of water to produce (Broz, 2008). Therefore, the 
rapid expansion of ethanol processing plants is contributing to the pressure on an already 
strained water supply. Concerns have been raised regarding the sustainability of local 
aquifers facing this additional withdrawal of water (Pimental, 2003; O’Brien, 2008; 
Higgins, Outlaw and Richardson 2008).  
The attempts of current research to estimate the far-reaching environmental 
impacts of ethanol are limited. Pimental (p130) summarizes the data by stating: 
“…corn production uses more herbicides and insecticides than any other 
crop produced in the U.S. thereby causing more water pollution than any 
other crop. Further, corn production uses more nitrogen fertilizer than any 
crop produced and therefore is a major contributor to ground water and 
river water pollution.” 
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At the time of this review, no quantitative analysis could be found which 
measured these impacts resulting from the expanded corn production. However, the claim 
necessitates further investigation into the degree to which ethanol production impacts the 
environment. It is too narrow an argument to focus on the life-cycle GHG emissions of 
ethanol fuel compared to gasoline. Indeed, expanding corn production, increasing the 
intensity to which agricultural land is farmed and the ethanol production processes 
themselves have wide environmental implications. 
Economic Impacts 
 As more ethanol plants are built and the production capacity of the industry is 
expanded, local economies are impacted. New jobs are created, inputs are purchased and 
investments are made. There may be more literature available regarding the economic 
impacts of ethanol production than any other individual topic. Ethanol plants are 
purported to be large employers, use large amounts of energy, contribute to the local tax 
base, utilize government subsidies and purchase large amounts of inputs from local 
suppliers. The economic impact of ethanol production should be large locally if not 
nationally as well. 
 The general public has implicitly taken an interest in ethanol supply and use. 
Through the VEETC, import tariffs and loan guarantees, that interest is materialized into 
the financial realms. Overall, Koplow estimated that government support for ethanol 
topped $5.1 billion in 2006. This included all support activities related to then-current 
ethanol production including feedstock producer support, capital development, blending, 
etc. Urbanchuk estimated that direct support for ethanol production and consumption, 
through the volumetric excise tax credit and the small producer subsidy, totaled $3.4 
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billion in 2007. This excludes the indirect subsidization of capital financing and 
feedstock supplies included in the Koplow study. Other estimates are higher as noted 
earlier in this paper. In contrast, the ethanol industry generated more than $4.6 billion in 
taxes for the federal government. Therefore, disregarding the indirect support of ethanol 
production, the industry produced a net surplus to the public coffers (Urbanchek, 2008).  
 At the micro-economic level, it is impractical to estimate the cumulative effects of 
all ethanol production. However, it is useful to estimate the impacts a new or existing 
plant might have on local economic activity. Generally, the studies which have estimated 
local economic impacts of ethanol plants have used input-output modeling programs such 
as IMPLAN for their analysis. These programs are capable of estimating the relative 
changes in employment, tax revenues and total business product for a defined economic 
region. They are especially useful because they analyze direct, indirect and induced 
effects of economic changes through multipliers. 
 Capital expenditures for new plants are substantial. Flanders et. al. (2007) 
estimated the costs for a 100 MGY facility in Georgia to be over $170 million. The same 
research indicated annual net returns of over $59 million. The total economic 
contribution to the state would be $314.2 million and all tax revenue through the state 
level would accrue a total of $4.572 million. In the study by Isserman and Low (2008) 
total revenues for a comparable plant were $203 million and $121 million for a smaller 
60 MGY capacity plant. Wage creation for the Isserman and Low (2008) study were $2.4 
million for an estimated 35 direct full-time equivalent employees. 
 The average ethanol plant capacity is currently around 64 million gallons per year 
(RFA, 2008). The largest of these has a capacity of approximately 115 MGY while the 
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smallest is around 5 MGY. Most of the studies done to estimate the local economic 
impacts of plants make the assumption of a 50-60 MGY plant, 100 MGY plant or a 
combination of the two. Most of the studies have similar results. Over half of ethanol 
plants employ between 20 and 49 workers (Isserman and Low, 2008). Swenson (2008) 
used a 41 MGY year plant in his study and found that 135 new jobs were created from an 
ethanol plant built in 2003. Flanders et. al. (2007) estimated 408 new jobs resulting from 
a newly constructed 100MGY plant. Isserman and Low (2008) estimate that for a 
100MGY plant, new job creation ranges from 152 to 248 in various counties. One of the 
most comprehensive studies found which measured job creation was Leatherman, 
Peterson and Schlosser (2008). They cite the Minnesota Department of Agriculture as 
estimating a total of 154 direct jobs created from 4 new facilities and 2,784 jobs 
altogether. The research also concludes that predicting the impacts in the future, 
especially with respect to jobs, is “risky and uncertain.” In any case, most of the 
predictions have fallen in line with each other and seem to be accurate over time. 
 Typically, ethanol plants are built in the most rural portions of the United States. 
The reason for this is because the most expensive input for these plants, corn grain, 
becomes quite expensive to transport much further than 100 miles away (Isserman and 
Low, 2008). In fact one of the most important economic impacts of the ethanol mandates 
is related to transportation. After feedstock and energy costs, freight is the next highest 
cost to an ethanol facility (Flanders, et. al., 2007). In one county from the Isserman and 
Low (2008) analysis, 250 jobs were created from all effects in the input-output model, 
including direct, indirect and induced effects. Of these, 57 were created in the 
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transportation sector. This is presumably from the increased freight delivery of grain to 
the plants and additional transport of ethanol to customers outside of the region.  
 The expansion of corn production has also increased the demand for suitable land 
on which to grow crops. The increased demand has in turn bid up rental rates on viable 
cropland. Using a Ricardian rent theory, Du, Edwards and Hennessy (2008) found no 
significant impact on rental rates resulting from ethanol expansion. However, data from 
Illinois Society of Professional Farm Managers and Rural Appraisers shows cash rents 
increased 10 % from 2006-2007 and between 10% and 20% the following year 
(ISPFMRA, 2007). The same data indicated a premium on acres which were closer to 
ethanol plants.  
 Whether due to higher land values or increased local grain demand, Schill (2007) 
also reported an increase in crop prices. This is consistent with the laws of supply and 
demand considering that corn producers have additional marketing choices when ethanol 
plants open in their area. This is supported by Babcock and Feng (2008) which 
demonstrated a “trickling down” effect on prices for other related crops. They said that as 
land allocation shifted in response to higher corn prices, soybean and other grain prices 
were also stimulated. 
 Certainly the effects of job creation, capital investment, tax generation, plant 
revenues, rental rates and crop prices are significant. And if one considers these 
individual effects for each plant multiplied for all plants across the country, the ethanol 
industry is measurably making an impact on the national economy. 
  Thus far we have discussed the various aspects of corn ethanol most often 
cited by ethanol advocates. With respect to energy issues and the potential for ethanol to 
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contribute to domestic energy security, I have shown that the potential is limited given 
the NEV as calculated by current research. In essence, fossil fuels which are mostly 
foreign sourced are still consumed to produce ethanol. Environmental impacts resulting 
from ethanol production are vague at best. While ethanol fuel has lower GHG emissions 
than convention gasoline, expansion of the corn supply and ethanol industry induces a 
number of collateral environmental effects which may more than offset the GHG 
reductions by using ethanol as a substitute for gasoline. Further research should aim to 
document these environmental changes in quantitative ways in order to be inclusive in 
environmental analysis. Finally, I have shown that diverting a substantial share of the 
U.S. corn crop into ethanol production does drive a sizeable economic footprint. Federal 
tax revenue likely outpaces subsidies, new jobs are created and multiplied impacts 
contribute greatly to local, regional and the national economies. I have not yet addressed 
the issue of reduced consumer energy prices or whether or not farm income has been 
stimulated. These points will be visited later in a discussion about creating a new 
artificial demand through the RFS and how farm prices are now inextricably linked to 
energy. 
Arguments Against Ethanol 
 In the case of corn producers, ethanol is naturally a desired market in which to 
sell the crop. It opens up a large market channel for value-added products and thereby 
decreases the price-taking anomaly which farmers face. In turn, the new demand for corn 
as an input for ethanol may drive corn prices higher which should benefit farmers. On the 
other hand, higher corn and grain prices in general adversely affect the livestock industry 
and even ethanol producing firms. The livestock industry often claims that since the 
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introduction of the RFS, already slim profit margins have shrunk and increased market 
volatility has made business activities more difficult. Ethical complications have also 
arisen lately as consumers claim that ethanol has caused an artificial price bubble. The 
historic price levels have far-reaching implications for food consumers around the world. 
This is the common “food vs. fuel” debate which is rarely explored very comprehensively 
but has ethical implications tied to it. One final argument set forth against ethanol is that 
without subsidies, it is not a viable industry. Therefore the large capital costs and 
investments in plants, infrastructure, etc. are “sunk” costs. Opponents of ethanol also 
dispute the benefits of ethanol fuel but this discussion was had previously. 
Impacts on the Livestock Industry 
Before EISA 2007 increased the RFS defined mandates from previous legislation, 
the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association sent a letter to congress on behalf of beef 
producers in the United States. Their position was as follows (Truitt, 2007): 
Due to the incredible expansion that has recently taken place within the 
corn-based ethanol industry, ranchers and cattle feeders are expanding 
their use of alternative feedstuffs, and doing their best to respond to the 
rapidly changing marketplace. However, corn is and will remain an 
essential input for their business. Mandating additional corn ethanol 
production will only serve to exacerbate an already difficult situation for 
cattle producers across the country. 
At the time of this letter, Corn prices had already increased by over 100% since three 
years prior (ERS, 2009). Indeed NCBA fears were confirmed after EISA 2007 was 
signed into law as prices peaked 87% higher eleven months later. 
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 The nature of beef markets in the U.S. is a key to understanding the position of 
NCBA. Most cattle destined for meat production are placed into a feedlot where 85% of 
feed rations are typically energy intensive feedstuffs like grain corn (NCBA, 2009). The 
traditional reason for this is the abundant surpluses of corn which have been produced in 
the United States since the 1950s. Corn has been relatively cheap compared to other feed 
components and this is what gave rise to grain feeding cattle. 
 But cattle are not the only livestock species dependent on corn and other grains in 
their production processes. The National Pork Producer’s Council (NPPC) takes the 
position that ethanol impacts will settle in the long-term but the short term implications 
jeopardize the industry’s competitiveness (NPPC, 2009). In a letter similar to the 
NCBA’s, the National Chicken Council (NCC) told the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) that “the Renewable Fuel Standard has distorted the market and has 
imposed severe economic harm on companies in our industry through dramatically higher 
input costs and is imposing harm on the general public in the form of higher prices, 
present or impending, for food products (NCC, 2008).” The NCC represents roughly 95% 
of broiler producers in the country. 
 Similar to the environmental impacts, many of the impacts ethanol has had on the 
livestock industry were unforeseen and heretofore minimally assessed. Most of the 
research attempting to objectively measure these notions tends to support the statements 
made by these three organizations. 
The problems which the livestock industry faces as a result of ethanol are rooted 
in the basic principles of supply and demand economics. By explicitly mandating the 
supply of corn ethanol, the RFS implicitly creates an artificial demand for the feedstock. 
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Ceteris paribus, if the corn market is in equilibrium, this new demand would exhaust 
supplies and the price of corn would invariably increase. The rate at which it would 
increase would only be limited by its own price elasticity of demand. Rosegrant (2008) 
agreed in a testimony to lawmakers regarding the sharp increase in food prices. He also 
indicated that in addition to the strain on commodity supplies, new competition is 
introduced to produce corn. Several simultaneous factors have also influenced 
commodity prices in recent years. Global weather conditions, developing economies and 
declining stocks have all contributed to the inflation. The proportional influence of each 
of these factors is difficult to measure and is often compared to growing global demand 
for biofuels (Rosegrant, 2008). 
But the livestock industry may be right to tag ethanol as the primary culprit 
behind rising commodity prices for two reasons: 1. The other factors are exogenously 
controlled while ethanol is an optional enterprise artificially imposed by the U.S. 
government, and, 2. A growing share of the corn crop is diverted to ethanol production. 
The portion of the corn crop diverted away from available supplies is substantial as 
shown by Figure 2. Before 2002, corn used for ethanol increased but never exceeded 7% 
of the current year’s production. Since 2002, the rate at which corn has been diverted into 
ethanol has accelerated (NCGA, 2008). In 2006, the year following the first RFS, the 
portion of the corn crop used for ethanol jumped from 14% to 20%. In 2008, roughly 
31% of 12.1 billion bushels was consumed by the ethanol industry (ERS, 2009).  
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Figure 2.  Share of Corn Crop Used for Ethanol 
 
Source: Economic Research Service 
 
The corn industry may say that this dramatic shift has essentially not adversely 
affected corn supplies because the annual corn crop has expanded to meet the ethanol 
demand for corn. A record 13.37 billion bushels was produced in 2007 (ERS, 2008) and 
despite a smaller crop in 2008, the remaining amount of corn has remained stable. The 
corn left after ethanol has remained steady at around 8.7 billion bushels (FAS, 2009). 
Therefore, the ethanol industry is simply “skimming the cream” off the top and not 
affecting corn price. On the other hand, beginning stocks have been declining since 2004 
(FAS, 2009) and are approaching historic lows. This combined with a growing global 
demand for grains may actually be the true driver behind grain prices. 
The reason for this is the price discovery mechanism used for setting price levels 
of commodities in the U.S. and subsequently in the world. Prices for commodities are 
determined in futures trading centers where contracts for future delivery are bought and 
sold. The price levels are determined by a number of commercial and non-commercial 
participants buying and selling in large part based on future expectations. Generally, 
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prices paid to farmers are based on these markets and adjusted for a transportation basis. 
If future expectations of grain supplies relative to demand are waning, and this due to a 
rapidly growing ethanol sector and declining worldwide stocks, then speculation about 
the trends might contribute to rapid price increases. One of the purposes of this 
manuscript is to explore the extent to which these markets drive price discovery, but the 
livestock industry may be right in pointing to ethanol as a primary cause for the increase 
in commodity prices. This will be addressed in chapters 4 and 5. 
 Yet even with all the gross diversion of acres and corn grain to the ethanol 
industry, the loss is not complete. Recall in chapter 1 the discussion regarding ethanol 
production. In both wet and dry milling, ethanol production generates byproducts. One of 
the main byproducts from dry milling, which accounts for 95% of all ethanol plants and 
nearly all new ethanol facilities, is Distillers Dried Grains with Solubles (DDGS).  
Of each 56 pound bushel of corn used for ethanol, roughly 17.4 pound is 
recovered in the form of DDGS (Baker and Zahniser, 2006). While it is not a perfect 
substitute for corn in livestock rations, it is highly sought after in ruminant feed 
(University of Minnesota, 2008). Nutritional analysis shows that DDGS has 91% of the 
digestible energy value of corn, which is the property desired by corn feeding. It is also 
high in protein, vitamins and is highly palatable to beef cattle (Kansas Ethanol, 2008).  
Approximately 80% of DDGS sold for feed are consumed by cattle (University of 
Minnesota, 2008). This is due to the fact that cattle are best suited to consume DDGS 
considering its low starch and high fiber contents (Babcock and Clemens, 2008). But 
there is a growing demand in the swine industry which has begun to feed DDGS at a rate 
of 10% in pig diets (Noll and Shurson, 2005). DDGS in swine rations is acceptable up to 
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20% of dry matter (Fabiosa, 2008). The poultry industry has also begun to include DDGS 
in broiler rations and is acceptable up to 10% of dry matter (Noll and Shurson, 2005). 
The biggest obstacle for poultry to use DDGS in rations is the concentrated level of fiber 
from the ethanol milling process (Maddy et. al., 2008). 
Economically, it is vital to understand that the consensus indicates no 
deterioration of carcass quality for cattle fed DDGS (Babcock et. al., 2008; Kansas 
Ethanol; Maddy et. al., 2008). Therefore, cattle producers and feeders should not be 
concerned about a loss in quality when substituting DDGS for some other feed 
component. In addition, there may be evidence that switching to DDGS in rations may 
have economic benefits to livestock producers. Tonsor (2006) performed an analysis 
which indicated hog production would benefit from DDGS inclusion. Other such studies 
support the idea that a cost savings is realized when switching to DDGS in light of the 
higher corn prices (Lawrence, 2006). The economics results for feeding DDGS to cattle 
are mixed. Lawrence (2006) indicates that the profitability of switching to DDGS 
depends on the ration inclusion rate and the weight of cattle at which they are started on 
DDGS. Daley (2007) performed research which indicated feed costs would be reduced by 
DDGS. But Babcock et. al. (2007) contends that the rapid loss of corn supply shifts to an 
increase demand for DDGS to such a degree that DDGS prices track corn prices. Their 
study states that it will happen to such a degree that producers will shift back to corn and 
soy based rations which had previously been deferred for cheaper DDGS (Babcock et. al., 
2007). In the same study, Babcock et. al. predicts that commodity price shocks resulting 
from ethanol are permanent, and cattle production will have adjust or beef prices will rise 
to reflect the increased costs of production.  
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Efforts to research the economic and nutritional benefits of DDGS as a feed are 
growing. It would appear that the nutritional characteristics are indisputably beneficial to 
cattle and DDGS is highly valuable as a livestock feed, especially in cattle. However, the 
economic tradeoffs between feeding corn and DDGS at equal prices are uncertain and 
should be explored further. Regardless of the substitutability of DDGS for corn, the 
ethanol mandate has fueled rising commodity prices and adversely affects the livestock 
industry. The extent to which this has occurred is ambiguous, but livestock production 
will have to adjust to a changing market structure. 
Impacts on Other Grain Markets 
 Perhaps a more dramatic effect which ethanol has made is that on other grain 
markets. When discussing the impacts ethanol has on the livestock industry, we really 
approach the issue from an issue of cost changes from a new demand sector competing 
for the same input – livestock and ethanol producers competing for corn. But this 
dramatic change to the profile of corn demand has also put pressure on the supply side. 
 In 2006, Elobeid et al. performed a study to analyze the impacts of the then-
current RFS (as stipulated by the Energy Policy Act of 2005) on external markets. The 
first measure of the study was that the breakeven price for corn would reach $4.05 per 
bushel in order to be sufficiently high enough to entice farmers to grow enough corn to 
satisfy the projected ethanol production. Corn ethanol production would expand to 31.5 
billion gallons by 2015 and a plethora of other effects would take place. Under the 
defined assumptions of the study, corn production would expand mostly at the expense of 
soybean acres. Additionally, demand for feed wheat would increase as a substitute for the 
diverted corn, putting added strain on wheat markets around the world. Therefore, wheat 
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exports would fall along with corn exports and pork and poultry production (Elobeid, 
2006).  
 The study is careful to point out that its precise measures should not be considered 
actual predictions of statistical adjustments. But the study is very useful in thinking 
through the scenario by which outside grain markets are affected. Because arable land in 
the U.S. is finite, we should consider what acreage shifts would occur as a result of 
increased corn demand. It also makes sense that wheat as an inferior feed product, 
implied by the apparent preference for corn, would find demand-side support from the 
livestock industry. Considering the idea that in many parts of the country corn is often 
cultivated in rotation with soybean crops, it also makes sense that additional corn demand 
will decrease the incentive to plant soybeans. In a previous section, the effect this would 
have on land fertility was examined and should be noted. Raising corn after corn in the 
same plot of land deteriorates the yields made possible by the resident soil.  
 These are only specific effects which would inherently be observed by tracking 
the consequences of the RFS. But it actually presents an example of a very simple 
economic principle. Resources are limited and must be rationed. A valid question is who 
should be the steward in deciding how to ration those resources and how do we justify 
their impacts throughout the general economy. 
 In July 2007, before the expanded RFS was signed into law later that year, 
Babcock, et al. updated and improved upon the 2006 study by Elobeid, et al. Their 
models used more tempered the assumptions and produced measures of ethanol impacts 
which I will review here. In the first place, they projected corn ethanol production to 
increase to 14.77 billion gallons by 2011. In order for the industry to sustain this 
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production, corn acres would have to increase to 94 million and average prices would 
have to be at $3.40 per bushel. Following these estimates, the livestock sector decreases 
production, exports decline and commodity prices increase. But the most interesting 
insight from their study is an analysis of the exposure to risk of an unforeseen event such 
as a major drought. Babcock, et al. (2007) showed that in case of a major sudden strain 
on supplies, that ethanol plants would operate until the price of corn was too high to 
operate a margin. But they point out that the result in the case where ethanol was 
operating under a mandate, the adjustments would take place externally to ethanol. 
Livestock and export markets would invariable be faced with the prospect of being forced 
out of competition for the available commodity supplies. 
 The literature which discusses the consequences imposed on outside grain 
markets as a result of corn ethanol is limited. This is one of the primary questions I seek 
to address in the following chapter. However, as opposed to projecting the effects of corn 
ethanol into the future, I will show what implied effects have already taken place as it 
correlates to the expansion of the ethanol industry. 
Food Vs. Fuel 
 There are also ethical ramifications for analyzing current U.S. biofuel policy. 
While some consider the environmental side of ethanol to be an ethical issue, a far more 
serious issue is the criticism that it violates societal morals to use food to produce fuel. 
Many group studies have begun to emerge which point to the ethical violation of 
producing biofuels before helping to feed the developing nations of the world. Those who 
subscribe to this criticism claim that biofuels have caused food price inflation making it 
more difficult for poorer nations to afford food products. They also say that those 
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precious resources used to produce food - such as seed, commodities, credit and capital – 
should go directly to satisfy hungry populations. 
 Both the Farm Foundation (2008) and Babcock, et al.(2007) cite biofuels as a 
concern for food production. They both assign some causality to biofuels for rising food 
costs. The subject they really bring into perspective is that in a world where population 
growth is inevitable and accelerating, food demand is at an all time high. They also point 
to flat-lining world food production and ever-tightening global food stocks. For example, 
in six out of the last eight years, wheat consumption has outstripped wheat production 
(FAS, 2009; ERS, 2009). And while it may be difficult to blame biofuels for reduced 
global wheat production, it begs the question as to what we will produce and for which 
demand. In chapter 4 I will explore this idea of whether or not ethanol has diverted 
resources away from wheat production.  
 The food vs. fuel debate is difficult to argue because the supporting data is vague. 
It also is so complex, that econometric analysis will produce mixed results at best. What 
is important is to raise the idea of a fuel vs. food war when considering the law of 
unintended consequences. After all, this paper is exploring the unintended consequences 
of creating the RFS, which was designed to address climate change, energy independence 
and rural prosperity. 
Linking Agriculture to Energy 
 Thus far I have discussed the merits of ethanol and the relative economic impacts 
of imposing the RFS onto the transportation fuel sector. But these changes and impacts 
are only the direct effects of the current biofuels policies. The more direct impact of the 
RFS is a structural change in the way which agricultural markets behave to exogenous 
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factors. Before 2005, the energy industry and policies were distinctly separate from 
agriculture. The extent to which the two markets were linked was limited by the cost of 
fuel and fertilizers as inputs for farm production and perhaps competition for capital 
resources. But beyond this, the two industries have not typically competed over land use 
or entry to consumer markets. Prices for these sectors’ respective goods were discovered 
in separate marketplaces and the factors which affected their trade were unique. Today, 
current literature shows a new and exceptional linkage between two fundamentally 
different markets. 
Figure 3 illustrates the linkage between corn price and crude oil. It is apparent that 
before 2005, the prices of each commodity moved independent of each other. But, since 
that same year, corn price has moved in a pattern very consistent with crude oil. 
Figure 3. Monthly Oil and corn Price. 
Source: Energy Information Agency, Department of Energy; Economic Research Service, USDA 
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This has been documented by numerous researchers. Taheripour and Tyner 
(2008) report that the correlation coefficient between corn and crude oil from 1982 – 
2007 is roughly .16. In the same study, they show that the correlations between crude and 
other energy products such as gasoline and ethanol range from .86 to .98. This is logical 
and the differences would be expected when calculating the correlation between distinct 
markets. As another example, the same study shows a .72 correlation coefficient for the 
corn and soybean complex. But since corn has become a major input in energy markets 
via ethanol, this has changed. Consider the fact that in 2000, about 604 million bushels 
were used to produce 1.63 billion gallons of corn ethanol. At the time, this represented 
6.1% of the total U.S. corn crop. By 2008 the portion of the corn crop going to produce 
corn ethanol was nearly 25% of an historically large corn supply. If energy now 
represents one-quarter of all U.S. corn demand, we should certainly see a measurably 
increased correlation between the two sectors of the economy. 
 Ethanol Producer Magazine (2008), an industry publication, reports that the 
correlation between crude and corn now stands at 75% since 2007, up from their own 
estimate of 65% since 2003. Other reports are more staggering. In a publication by the 
Kansas Farm Bureau in June 2008, linear regression modeling was used to estimate the 
R-squared coefficient for several commodities and crude oil. Their approach was to 
analyze the impact which a rise in crude oil price now has on variable costs of production 
per acre for dryland and irrigated corn, grain sorghum, wheat and soybeans. They 
concluded that all variable costs were highly sensitive to a change in crude oil price. For 
data ranging from 1992 to 2007, they show that costs of production for dryland corn and 
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irrigated corn rise by $1.02 and $0.56 respectively. In addition, they report that the 
correlation for these costs to crude oil are .88 for dryland corn and .93 for irrigated corn. 
 Mitchell (as cited in Delgado, 2009) shows that since oil has been above $50 per 
barrel of crude, that the R-square with corn price has been .75. He also shows a less 
impressive correlation of .52 when crude is below $50 per barrel, but this only 
substantiates the reports earlier cited because crude has not been below $50 since 2005 
when the first version of the RFS was signed into law. In the same year, corn used for 
ethanol had not yet exceeded 12% of the domestic corn supply. 
Commodity Futures Markets 
As stated in the introductory chapter, one of the primary purposes of this thesis is 
to explore what effect the introduction of the RFS has had on agricultural markets. One of 
the main centers of activity within the agricultural sector are the futures markets. These 
are more commonly referred to as Board’s of Trade (BOT), but are the center of activities 
revolving around the trading of futures contracts for delivery of commodities at a later 
date.  
The various BOTs are used as points of price discovery in the agricultural 
community. Commodity suppliers, user’s, brokers and processors alike utilize these 
center to find relative values for their commodities and to manage the risks associated 
with price fluctuations in the future (CFTC, 2008). A detailed explanation of how futures 
markets are utilized and the mechanics thereof is not presented here, but the reader may 
find myriad material reviewing the concepts relating to them, such as Koontz and Purcell 
(1999). 
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As a background, speculators play a vital role in the futures market. Their most 
cited benefit is that they bring added liquidity to futures trading. They voluntarily enter 
futures trading for the chance at arbitraging profits while taking on risk the other 
participants would not. They provide an immediate buyer to a seller of futures contracts 
and/or act as an immediate seller of contracts when a buyer is present. There is little 
dispute as to the benefits of having these additional market participants.  
A topic of recent interest affecting the stakeholders of these trading centers is the 
effectiveness to accomplish their purpose which is described by the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (CFTC). Many have questioned the ability of futures markets to not 
only discover commodity values, but whether or not the ability to assist in risk 
management has been diminished since the introduction of the RFS. There have been 
many claims regarding increased volatility and lack of price convergence at the 
expiration of contracts. Many BOT participants have claimed that speculation in the 
futures markets has led to this problematic pricing action in the futures markets. 
Since 2005, historical and implied volatilities for world commodities have 
reached unprecedented levels (FAO, 2008). Bange (2008) supports this calculation and 
attributes part of the volatility to linking agriculture to energy markets and the accelerated 
production of biofuels in the U.S. and abroad. Others within industry circles have 
assigned blame for the volatility to increased speculation in the marketplace (Seeking 
Alpha, 2009). But the Government Accountability Office (2009) released a publication in 
which eight empirical studies were reviewed. GAO concluded that none of these studies 
found significant statistical evidence which pointed to speculation as a cause of the 
recently increased price volatility in agricultural markets. Furthermore, a study done on 
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behalf of various BOTs by Informa Economics (2008) makes a pointed insight. The study 
points out the difiiculty in assigning causality between speculation and volatility as the 
one may attract the other. Speculators are often drawn to volatile markets where arbitrage 
may take place and conversely, the increased participation in a market may contribute to 
grater price swings from period to period.  
The same research by Informa and other studies (Irwin, Merrin and Sanders, 
2008) have found that the market participation rates have changed in recent years. Nearly 
all the studies reviewed used some version of the Commitment of Traders report put forth 
by the CFTC. The data in this report which is released to the public is a weekly sample of 
the full dataset which is considered private. The report details the participation of groups 
distinguished as large traders and classified as either commercial or non-commercial. It 
tracks each segment’s ownership of open interest in the futures markets. It further 
categorizes the non-commercial into various groups such as indexers, money managers 
and general non commercial participants. All of these groups are considered speculators. 
Irwin, Merrin and Sanders (2008) measured two time period in the COT dataset, 
the first ranging from 1995 through 2005 and the second covering 2005 through 2008. 
They found that between the two periods, open interest held by non-commercial 
participants (speculators) increased from 28% to 39%. The commercially-held open 
interest remained relatively steady at 46-47%. Interestingly, the non-reporting segment 
(which consists of traders who trade a small enough volume to be exempt from the 
reporting process) showed a decrease from 25% to 15%. This would lend credit to the 
idea that most of this participation change may have resulted as a result of this non-
reporting group trading substantial volume so as to lose exemption from the reporting 
 
 
51
criteria. Informa also contributed yet another useful insight to the trader participation. It 
essentially showed that while the participation rates may have changed, the relative 
behavior of each group throughout the life of a futures contract did not. Overall, both 
studies recorded sizeable increases in volume of open interest which will be evaluated by 
this paper as well in chapter 4. 
The role which the RFS has played in the futures markets is difficult to quantify. 
In the following chapter, I will present my theoretical approach on what might be 
expected by introducing such a large artificial demand for agricultural commodities. It 
may be summed up by the idea that when such a shock takes place in any market, there 
must be an initial period where the long known equilibrium is lost and must re-adjust. 
Where the futures markets are the central point in which price discovery takes place, 
these centers must invariably be the first to adjust and at times in the most unprecedented 
ways. 
Conclusion 
The issues related to ethanol and the effects of the RFS are so broad in scope that 
many researchers have conceded that it would be difficult to truly quantify the effects of 
U.S. biofuel policy. What is certain, however, is that the RFS and the sheer scale on 
which ethanol is currently being produced, and that which will be produced in the future, 
has lasting ramifications for agriculture and energy markets, as well as environmental and 
social clusters. It would be difficult to objectively measure each of the unique facets of 
ethanol production in one single paper.  
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Chapter 4 – Theoretical Discussion, Methods of Analysis, and Data 
Economic Theory  
 Thus far the issues which surround the introduction of corn ethanol as a major 
substitution for transportation fuel in the United States have been examined. The RFS 
essentially creates a new demand for ethanol and stipulates the volume as well. But as far 
as the market structure is concerned, how should we expect the forces of supply and 
demand to interact? More specifically, what will happen to the commodity markets as 
this new demand places increased pressure on corn supplies and raises the level of 
competition for inputs? What will be the response by suppliers and what should that 
mean for market participants? These questions will be the subject of this chapter.  
 I emphasize again that the RFS does not mandate ethanol production. Rather, it 
creates a blending floor – the minimum amount of ethanol which a blender must mix into 
the gasoline supply from year to year. It also stipulates that by 2022, 15 billion gallons of 
the total 36 outlined in the RFS must come from corn-ethanol. Therefore, it is essentially 
a mandated purchase of ethanol produced from corn. This purchase of corn ethanol 
inevitably translates into purchases of corn. The corn purchase raises the first economic 
issue of derived demand. 
 The first laws of supply and demand are simple. The economic community 
universally recognizes that as supply increases, so does downward pressure on prices, 
ceteris paribus. If supply decreases, prices will increase ceteris paribus. Conversely, if 
demand increases price will follow by increasing as well. If demand decreases, there is a 
relative oversupply of goods and therefore prices will fall. 
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 When the U.S government introduced and implemented the RFS, they essentially 
created an indirect demand for a proportional quantity of corn. It is reasonable to apply 
the assumption that the demand for corn is proportional for two reasons: 1) The 
conversion efficiency of corn to ethanol has basically flat-lined at 2.7 gallons of ethanol 
per bushel of corn, and 2) The RFS defines fixed minimum blending amounts for 
refiners. For example, in 2015, the RFS commands that 15 billion gallons of corn ethanol 
be used in the national transportation supply. Therefore, this also mandates the use of 
approximately 5.55 billion bushels of corn. Unless, the conversion ratio improves 
considerably, this is a direct and proportional level of corn use, tied to the RFS.  
 In that case, assuming no other demand factors change, the effects of the RFS on 
supply and demand can be illustrated through the charts in Figures 4. The changes can be 
summarized in three basic events or periods. The first event will be an initial shock to the 
demand profile for corn. This will result in the demand curve shifting outward, causing 
price to increase substantially and generating real economic profit to corn producers.  The 
second period will mainly be a period of price discovery. This will include incremental 
adjustments in supply, demand and long run average costs and prices will be quite 
volatile as the market searches for a new equilibrium price. Finally, as supply adjusts to 
meet demand at the minimum long run average cost, equilibrium price will be discovered 
at a level greater than the preceding period. In the long-run, industry profits will fall 
again to zero and the market as a whole will face the fundamental challenges inherent to 
agriculture, such as the technological treadmill. An important assumption to this analysis 
is that the change in demand is a one-time event in slight contrast to the ongoing 
expansion of the RFS. The perspective will be that from the final results of the maximum  
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Figure 4.  Theoretical Changes in Supply, Demand and Costs.   
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defined amount of corn based ethanol in the RFS, i.e. in 2015 and beyond. In stating this 
assumption, it would be plausible for these changes to occur periodically, each time the 
RFS is adjusted.  However, the net effect will be the same, although the short-run impacts 
will be drawn out over a longer period. The assumption is also made that aside from the 
RFS, normal growth or contraction (as affected by continuous economic conditions) will 
occur in the other corn-demand centers.  A more detailed explanation of each period now 
follows. 
Period 1 
 I have already described how the RFS defines a direct quantity of corn usage. The 
net effect of this action is an outward shift in the demand curve shown in Figure 4. The 
effects here do not yet transpire into the marketplace.  At the current historic levels of 
corn production around 10 billion bushels, this demand shift will be by an amount of 50% 
or more after including the whole 15 billion gallon ethanol mandate. This will create a 
major deficit in corn supply. 
 The more noteworthy change is a loss of stable equilibrium price. The new 
temporary equilibrium price at the intersection of the original supply and the new demand 
is well above the industry long run average cost.  Thus, there is economic profit in the 
industry and from the theory of competitive markets, this can not exist in the long run.  
Period 2 
 Period 2 is really a period of adjustment. After the demand has been established, 
higher prices and higher profits signal to producers that the quantity supplied is too little 
to meet demand. Existing producers expand production by increasing acreage, buying 
higher-yielding seed or intensifying cultivation practices. New entrants also seize the 
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opportunity to take advantage of profit taking in the new environment. These are the 
firms which may have been priced out of the market in the past due to production costs 
which exceeded the market price. In agriculture this may equate to bringing acreage into 
production that is marginally productive, but essentially new supply is added to the 
industry. The new supply is driven by more attractive prices that formerly discouraged 
added production. 
 The defining aspect of this behavior is uncertainty. The relationship between the 
supply and demand functions are determined by what Adam Smith termed “the invisible 
hand.”  In this day and age, many of the invisible fingers of the hand have been identified 
and it is their behavior which remains imperfectly detectable to economists today. I 
submit that the uncertainty factor may actually be the arm to which the invisible hand is 
attached.  
For example, if I am a corn producing farm in a stagnant market, it is fairly simple 
to determine my production costs and profitability. If input costs are stable, financing is 
acquired and my operating procedures established, I can predict within narrowly defined 
expectations what effect the weather and other uncontrollable risks will have on my farm. 
This is only possible because the uncertainty of the future of my production is limited. It 
is also facilitated by my expectations for a stable market in which to sell my corn, if we 
make the assumption that it is so. 
 However, even if the market is established or expanded, such as it is with the 
RFS, the uncertainty may cause me to over or under-react in my production practices. For 
example, if I know that demand has shifted outward, I no longer know how the 
cumulative supply base is composed. I will be uncertain about the production of corn 
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producers in neighboring markets whereas before, the market was stable. Will they 
produce more in response to the new demand? How much more? Perhaps other areas will 
more than compensate the new demand with increased supply. In that case, if my farm 
increases output, then I have overproduced and the market will respond with depressed 
prices. If the total supply hesitates, and I keep my production steady, then I will have 
under produced, contributing to higher market prices but for a smaller quantity than I 
otherwise could have been compensated. 
 A difficult phenomenon perpetuates this cycle of uncertainty in agriculture. Grain 
crops throughout the world are produced once a year. Excepting weather, crop production 
cannot be altered for that marketing year once planting has taken place. In the current 
year, prices may be exceptionally high, signaling to producers to expand production. 
During the idle months farmers may accumulate inputs, operating loans and labor in 
preparation for taking advantage of the higher prices the next year. However, if the 
industry as a whole increases output in the next year, then there may be a surplus. The 
surplus will conversely discourage increased output or lead to decreased production. 
While other industries may be able to react more quickly, output in agriculture is mostly 
determined once a year. 
 There is another issue of uncertainty especially relating to corn production. In 
many parts of the corn belt, corn is grown in rotation with soybeans or cotton. If more 
acreage is devoted to corn at the expense of these other crops, then there may be a 
shortage in those markets. This will drive prices for soybeans and cotton higher and 
possibly lead next year’s producers to favor them over corn. The market will go through a 
“learning curve” as it attempts to find the equilibrium price for each of these commodities 
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as well as the right supply. This also occurs on the demand side. If I am a food processing 
firm, how much should I pay for corn as an input? If I pay the current price with the 
expanded demand, I may not get enough corn because the market will have bid the prices 
higher in light of the deficit. However, if I pay a higher price, I run the risk of paying too 
much and overcompensating what the market dictates.  
 The crux of the problem in both of these cases is a lack of an established 
equilibrium perpetuated by uncertainty. The individual effects will be multiplied 
thousands of times on both the supply and demand side causing the market to take huge 
swings in each direction. It will continue as long as the future outcome of prices and the 
overall supply-demand relationships are unknown and unreliable. In fact, each action will 
lead to lesser reactions over time and this will continue until the market equilibrium is 
settled.  These over and under reactions are what lead the trading centers to be 
characterized by increased volatility. It is the law of unintended consequences in play. 
While the RFS aims to address climate change, farmer income and energy independence, 
it says nothing of uncertainty or volatility. 
These responses will also set off chain reactions in the farm input markets. While 
resources are limited, the demand for inputs will increase sharply over existing supply. 
For farmers, cash rents will rise, fertilizer prices will increase, seed will cost more labor 
will be strained and farm equipment will have to stretch to increase output. 
But all firms and all land are not created equal. In the case of new producers, they 
are only enticed to enter the market by the higher prices. They would have previously 
been excluded from the supply because their marginal costs of production were too high. 
Likewise, the land which was previously not used for corn, was either more valuable 
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being used for the previous crop, or as sitting idle in the CRP. Because of these two 
factors, the supply will only expand until it is no longer profitable for new firms or new 
acres to enter the corn market. 
But the price signals in each period will determine the outcome of these effects. 
With the level of demand established, each time there is a supply response, the market 
will transmit a signal in the form of a temporary equilibrium price. In the next production 
period, the signal will either deter or entice a change in corn production accordingly, 
opening up to or excluding additional supply. This continues until the equilibrium supply 
is settled and the relative price is discovered. But this price discovery will most likely be 
multidirectional until the market settles, as explained by the uncertainty and behavior of 
equilibrium levels. It would seem that at the time of the writing of this thesis, the corn 
market is in this period 2 of price discovery. 
Period 3 
Period three is characterized by a few simpler but identifiable events. In the first 
case, a new equilibrium is established. This is made possible by a decrease in the 
fluctuations in supply and the new supply base sufficiently meeting the existing demand. 
The volatility in the market is now limited to what the historical factors have always 
been, such as weather, technology, etc. 
In Figure 4, the most intriguing aspect of the new equilibrium is revealed. The 
new price is actually very near the old price. The new price should not settle below the 
old price. The new price would likely by higher than the old price, but only insomuch as 
production functions of producers and corn buyers have been changed by the general 
economy. Although a detailed analysis of the mathematical properties of the supply and 
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demand curves will not be given here, it suffices to say that any increase in the new 
equilibrium price will be limited by these factors. The price cannot magically increase 
over historic levels beyond inflationary support and the nature of the supply, demand, and 
long run average cost curves. 
Method of Analysis 
The three specific objectives of this thesis as set forth in chapter one are to: 
1. determine if there has been a structural change in the supple, demand and price 
relationship in the corn industry; 
2. determine if commodity brokers believe that the futures market is still effective 
tool manage price risk for their clients; and  
3. determine how farm profitability and risk has changed as a result of  ethanol 
policy with its intended and unintended consequences. 
The methods to achieve each of the objectives are now discussed.  There is a separate 
subsection for each objective. 
Structural Change 
 The theoretical discussion above suggests that there should have been an initial 
period of rapid price increase in period one, following the passage of the RFS ethanol 
mandates.  This should then be followed by a lengthier period of price volatility in period 
two.  At the time of this thesis being written, the corn market is in period 2.  Empirical 
evidence exists to substantiate the theory.  Monthly corn futures prices for the nearby 
contract on the Chicago Board of Trade will be evaluated over the last ten years.  A plot 
of these prices is instructive to look at the price increase following the ethanol mandates.  
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The standard deviation of the monthly prices will also be calculated for the time period 
prior to the 2005 RFS and then for the period following that time period. 
 From the theoretical discussion, it was also postulated that there would be shifts in 
supply in period two as producers responded to increased profitability.   The most 
quantifiable change which commodity producers have in their power is how much 
acreage to plant. Production is defined as yield per acre times acres, but yield is out of the 
control of the farmer. Yield varies by technology and weather. It is true that producers are 
able to influence yields through farm practices, especially fertilizer applications, but as a 
general rule, commodity yields increase at a steady rate from year to year. 
 Acreage planted, on the other hand is in direct control of the producer-farmer. If 
prices go up, for example, and lead the producer to increased potential for higher returns, 
the response will typically be to expand production through plantings. This expansion 
may come in the form of reduced acreage of other crops, or may extend into cultivating 
marginal fields which were previously left idle (including CRP acres). But 
fundamentally, there may be no better approach to measuring market behavior on the 
supply side than to analyze acreage shifts. Planted acreage will be used, as this is the 
factor which a producer has in his control and, therefore, it is a good measure of market 
behavior. Harvested acres also provide good insight, but are less reliable since factors out 
of producer control influence these numbers. 
 Actual acreage, the change in acreage, and the percent change in acreage from 
1996-2008 will be evaluated for the top ten major crops grown in the US.  Then corn 
acreage changes will be evaluated over the same time period.  Since corn in the south is 
frequently grown in rotation with cotton and in the north in rotation with soybeans, 
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acreage changes of these three crops will be looked at as well.  Wheat and corn do not 
typically compete for the same acres.  However, an analysis of wheat acreage will also be 
undertaken to see if those acres have been altered by changing corn acres. 
 The theoretical section suggested that during period two, supply, demand and 
costs may all be changing simultaneously.  Many of our economic tools, such as 
measures of elasticity, are only valid when one thing changes and everything else is 
constant.   A primarily graphical analysis will be conducted on the corn, soybean and 
wheat market evaluating the ratio of price to supply. This measures the historical 
relationship between these two variables and establishes the historical norm for 
proportional changes. The statistic is calculated by dividing the average price received for 
the corresponding crop marketing year by total supply of each commodity in bushels 
from 1970 through 2008. In order to smooth the fluctuations in these numbers, a three-
year moving average is calculated resulting in new data for 1972 through 2008. This 
three-year moving average is in the analysis.  
The data are divided into two time periods: Pre-RFS (1972 – 2005) and Post-RFS 
(2006-2008). First, the mean is calculated for all data points in the group. Then, the 
standard deviation of the set is measured. Recall the RFS was signed into law in July 
2005, after that year’s crop decisions had been made. For each of these time periods, the 
average deviation from the overall mean is calculated. A more localized time period is 
also evaluated from 2000 – 2008 while still segregating the pre and post RFS periods. 
Many participants in the corn industry have used ending stocks, or expected 
ending stocks, as a key measure to predict corn price.  Expected ending stocks are 
defined as: 
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Expected ending stocks = beginning stocks + production + imports - seed & industrial – 
exports – feed & residual 
where expected ending stocks are the bushels expected to remain in storage at the end of 
the marketing year; beginning stocks are the prior years ending stocks; production is the 
crop year annual production; imports are total imports; seed & industrial are the quantity 
of the crop used for seed and for all industrial use; exports are total crop exports; and feed 
& residual is the quantity used as feed.  All measures are in bushels. 
A smaller ending stocks or expected ending stocks are generally expected to 
increase price while a larger ending stocks are expected to decrease price.  The 
relationship is also not likely to be linear.  When stocks are expected to be very small, 
price may increase substantially to effectively ration the smaller supply.  On the other 
hand, there has generally been some level of price support to prop up prices when the 
ending stocks are very large. 
The following equation is estimated using OLS regression to determine the nature 
of this relationship: 
(1) PCi = b0 + b1*ESi + b2*ES2i + ei  
where PC is the price of corn in dollars per bushel, ES is the ending stocks in 1,000 
bushels, ES2 is ending stocks squared, e is an error term and i is a subscript for crop year 
from 1989-90 to 2008-09.  Prior government policy had resulted in huge stock of corn in 
the mid 1980’s.  This policy was changed and stocks were drawn down in the late 1980’s.  
That is why stocks are evaluated since 1989. The first 14 years of data will be used to 
estimate the equation and then the last six years will be predicted based on the parameter 
estimates of the equation.  The mean square error, MSE, will be determined and 
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compared for the estimation time period, for the 2003-04 to 2005-06, and for the 2006-07 
to 2008-09 time periods.  MSE is defined as follows: 
(2) MSE = (PCi – predicted PCi)2/n. 
Evidence of structural change will be noted if the MSE substantially differs for either 
of the predicted time periods. 
The ending stocks to use ratio is a key measure used by industry participants to 
make price forecasts and to help guide production, storage and other marketing decisions.  
It is defined as the total ending stocks divided by the total use for a particular crop. This 
ratio is essentially designed to determine the number of days which an agricultural 
industry could operate into the current crop year given the level of ending stocks of the 
previous year. Implicitly, a smaller ending stocks should support prices because falling 
stocks might indicate a shortage. Conversely, rising stocks would depress prices because 
this trend might indicate an oncoming surplus.  A graphical analysis will be undertaken 
for corn, soybeans and wheat evaluating the stocks to use ratio and price for each of these 
crops.  
While ending stocks is an often used measure to predict price, it is not effective for 
evaluating individual supply or demand components impact on price.  The following 
equation is used to evaluate the individual components impact on price and to determine 
if the government mandates on ethanol use has impacted these relationships: 
(3) PCi = b0 + b1*BSi + b2*PRODi + b3*INDi + b4*FEEDi + b5*EXPi + b6*MDATEi 
+ b7*INDxMDATEi + ei  
where PC is the price of in dollars per bushel, BS is beginning stocks in 1,000 bushel, 
PROD is production in 1,000 bushel, IND is food, seed and industrial use in 1,000 
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bushel, FEED is feed and residual use in 1,000 bushel, EXP is exports in 1,000 bushel, 
MDATE is a 0/1 dummy variable that takes on the value of one for the crop years 2002-
03 though 2008-09 when federal mandated for ethanol use were imposed, INDxMDATE 
is an interaction term between the government mandate and the food, seed and industrial 
variable, and e and i are as previously defined in equation 1.  A priori expectations are 
that the parameter estimates for BS and PROD will be negative and that the parameter 
estimates for IND, FEED and EXP will all be positive.  If either of the parameter 
estimates for MDATE or INDxMDATE are significantly different from zero, than this 
will indicate a structural change in the model; MDATE being a change in the intercept 
and INDxMDATE being a change in the slope of the IND parameter. 
Futures Market Use 
One of the objectives of this thesis was to determine if the structural changes in 
the corn market and the perceived increase in volatility by industry participants were 
impacting the futures market.  More specifically, are traders able to still use the futures 
market to hedge corn or are speculators dominating this market.  Primary data will be 
collected via a survey to various commodity futures brokers throughout the United States. 
The survey in full can be reviewed in Appendix A. The justification for the survey is to 
gauge the perspective of those closest to the market trading activities to answer the 
question posed by the objective.  
The brokers to be surveyed were selected from a list of those most likely to 
service commercial trading demand, i.e. commodity producers, traders and users. By 
selecting survey participants from this group, whether or not the commercial side of the 
market is overwhelmed by new speculation may be determined. The results of the survey 
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should expose whether or not there has been a tangible shift in trading activity since the 
RFS. If there has been such a shift, then the claims by market participants regarding 
speculation and its influence on price increases may be founded to a certain degree.  
Overall, the survey was distributed to 88 country brokers selected from various 
online phone directories. The criterion was to select as many as contact information was 
available for independent or small brokerage firms in 17 major agricultural states.  The 
survey was sent via regular US mail and also via email to those brokers who had an email 
address listed on their contact information.  The survey could be completed on paper and 
returned in the US mail or it could be completed in an on-line interactive PDF file and 
returned electronically.  A follow-up letter and email were also sent out to those who had 
not responded, requesting their response to the survey. 
Once the surveys were returned the data were entered into a spreadsheet to check 
the data.  Means and proportions were determined for the variables that were appropriate.  
A qualitative analysis was also undertaken, as some of the questions were requesting a 
written response from those surveyed. 
Farm Sector 
An enterprise budget for corn production from University of Arkansas 
Cooperative Extension Service is employed to estimate the effects of the RFS on farm 
income. A per acre analysis of costs is used in the budget. The budget was compiled for 
center-pivot irrigated corn in loamy soils and includes a breakdown of variable costs and 
fixed costs. Net return is calculated by subtracting variable costs plus fixed costs from 
total revenue. Total revenue is calculated by multiplying yield per acre in bushels times 
the price per bushel received. 
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The analysis is performed for two distinct periods representing the pre RFS and 
post RFS market conditions. The most significant differences between the two periods as 
indicated by national data are farm-gate price received, fertilizer costs and fuel price. To 
account for these changes, the same method is used for each of the three variables as 
follows.  
First, all factors other than price received, fertilizer price and fuel costs defined by 
the published budgets are left to remain constant as given by the author. These factors are 
considered relatively constant throughout both periods by the author of this thesis. 
Second, for each of the variables of interest, summary statistics are calculated for the two 
periods. 
For the pre RFS period, an average farm gate price and the standard deviation for 
monthly data is calculated from January 2000 through January 2005. For the post RFS 
period, the average is calculated from January 2008 through November 2008 while the 
standard deviation from January 2005 through November 2008 is used. The reason for 
this difference is that the period of interest being measured here is the year 2008. Average 
prices received in 2008 were higher than in 2007 and 2006. However, the relative 
volatility, as measured by the standard deviation here was relatively constant from 2005 
through 2008. These two statistics are more relevant to each other from a practical 
standpoint. Fertilizer costs are calculated in the same way as corn prices.  
Fuel price calculations are slightly different. For the pre-RFS period, the mean 
used is from March 2005 through October 2005 while the standard deviation is calculated 
from November 2000 through October 2005. For the post RFS period, the mean used is 
for March 2008 through November 2008 and the standard deviation is calculated for 
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November 2004 through November 2008. The justification lies again in practicality. 
While fertilizer and corn prices are commonly contracted and locked in throughout all 
times of the year, fuel is typically purchased on an ongoing and as-needed basis. Because 
use of farm machinery is typically being used from March through November from year 
to year (the planting to harvest months), this mean is chosen to represent more accurate 
costs. The standard deviations are more uniform for the whole periods, however, which 
make them more relevant to the calculations. 
The Arkansas corn budget is analyzed by Simetar®, simulation and econometrics 
to analyze risk. This program is an add-in for Microsoft® Excel and allows for built in 
Monte Carlo simulation of outcomes based on historical data. The statistics described for 
the variables above are allowed to change within the budget based on a defined 
distribution. The distributions used in this analysis are all normal distributions based on 
the means and standard deviations calculated by the methods described previously. The 
simulation program uses the given distributions of the variables then runs a numbers of 
simulated outcomes for the number of times defined by the user. The number of iterations 
used in this analysis is 500. This is meant to represent 500 possible outcomes in net 
return per acre based on the distribution and means of the fluctuating components with 
their own calculated variability. 
Data 
Most of the data used in this analysis is compiled from public sources such as 
various U.S. government agencies. Researchers are fortunate in this country to have 
access to the vast array of data available from organizations like the USDA and others. 
Most of this is secondary data and the author gives credit to the sources. Primary data 
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was also collected for the market analysis section below. All the data used in this thesis 
are national in scope except for the data collected from the survey. 
Fundamental Analysis 
 All data used in the analysis of acreage shifts are compiled from the National 
Agricultural Statistics Service. The agricultural statistics database was queried to obtain 
statistics of the planted and harvest acres, production in bushels and the marketing year 
average farm price.  
 The price analysis is primarily performed using price data from the Economic 
Research Service at the USDA. Prices are marketing year averages for farm gate prices 
received. The corn utilization for this analysis is also collected from the ERS. In all cases, 
the data may be accessed at the feed grains database custom query on the internet. The 
data for beginning stocks and total supply are compiled from the Foreign Agricultural 
Service production supply and demand estimate online query.  
 The charts and data of ethanol other uses of corn were gathered from the feed 
grains database at the ERS. The same price data is used as for the previous analysis. 
Futures Market Analysis 
 The main analysis of the futures market was performed by a direct survey to 88 
commodity brokers throughout 17 crop producing states. The states included in the list 
were: Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, 
Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Washington and 
Wisconsin. The list was compiled using phone directories for each state in the covered 
area. While the list was not perfectly random, the recipients of the survey represented 
most of the country brokers which could be found in local telephone directories. 
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Farm Income Sensitivity 
 Farm gate prices used in the sensitivity analysis are gathered from the NASS 
quick stats database for individual states. These prices are the monthly average farm price 
for the corn in Arkansas. Fuel prices are gathered from the U.S. Department of Energy 
Information Agency. The EIA maintains a database of retail level prices for various types 
of fuel on a regional basis. Fuel prices used here are for PADD II, the Midwest region. 
Retail diesel prices are used in place of farm diesel prices for two reasons: the price 
difference will vary from state to state according to local tax schedules and these prices 
will follow the exact pattern of farm diesel prices in each locality. The prices changes are 
what are important in the analysis. Finally, fertilizer prices are compiled from the ERS 
index of fertilizer prices accessible online.  
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Chapter 5 – Results 
This chapter will begin with an analysis of the shifts in fundamental factors of the 
corn and related crop markets. This will begin with a look at historical corn prices, 
followed by an overview of the acreage profile, a statistical analysis of the relationship 
between supply and price and finally a simple breakdown of corn use and supply, 
segregating ethanol use from other domestic uses of corn. Following the fundamental 
analysis will be an analysis of the volatility in the corn futures market and a synopsis of 
the changing structure of the futures markets from the survey of futures brokers. The last 
section will review the results of sensitivity analysis performed on farmer enterprise 
budgets for corn production in different producing regions. 
Structural Change 
 This section will begin with the empirical representation of what was expected in 
the theory for period one and two following the demand shock: a chart depicting a rapid 
increase in monthly prices followed by a period of volatility is displayed in Figure 5.  It is 
quite apparent that prices rose rapidly following the 2005 and 2007 RFS mandates.  This 
is what was expected based on the theoretical discussion in the initial period.  However, 
prices have also fallen recently, indicative of moving into a period of changing supply 
and demand as the market searches for a new equilibrium. It is true that general economic 
conditions have deteriorated and have influenced this drop as well, but perhaps this was 
only enhancing the expected effects as outlined above.  The standard deviation of these 
monthly prices was also calculated for the period prior to the 2005 RFS introduction and 
for the period since then.  The standard deviation for the pre-RFS period was 0.263 and it 
was 1.326 for the post-RFS period.  This empirical evidence supports the theory that  
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Figure 5. Monthly average corn futures price for the nearby contract, Oct 1998-Feb 2009. 
 
suggested prices would become more volatile as the market searched for a new 
equilibrium. 
Acreage Analysis 
Table 3 summarizes the acreage changes from 1996 – 2008 for a ten crop set. The 
ten major crops included in this group (as defined by the ERS) are all barley, corn for 
grain, all cotton, oats, all potatoes, all rice, sorghum for grain, soybeans, sugar beets and 
all wheat. These crops represent the majority of food and feed commodities produced 
throughout the United States which is why they were chosen. The most striking aspect of 
this table is that from year to year the changes in total acres fluctuates no more than 2-
3%. In fact, from 1996 through 2008 there was actually a decrease of approximately 9 
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Table 3 .  Ten Crop* Acreage Changes 1966-2008 (thousands of acres). 
Year Total Acres Year to Year Change Year to Year Percent 
Change 
 Planted Harvested Planted Harvested Planted Harvested 
1996 264249.1 238687.5     
1997 262546.4 242375.3 -1702.7 3687.8 -0.6% 1.5% 
1998 259866.9 234682.9 -2679.5 -7692.4 -1.0% -3.2% 
1999 255415.8 234721.4 -4451.1 38.5 -1.7% 0.0% 
2000 259133.5 232084.4 3717.7 -2637 1.5% -1.1% 
2001 252209.4 227620.8 -6924.1 -4463.6 -2.7% -1.9% 
2002 254374.2 222284.3 2164.8 -5336.5 0.9% -2.3% 
2003 253957.9 230768 -416.3 8483.7 -0.2% 3.8% 
2004 252502.2 228548.4 -1455.7 -2219.6 -0.6% -1.0% 
2005 246983.7 226448.9 -5518.5 -2099.5 -2.2% -0.9% 
2006 247187.7 218104 204 -8344.9 0.1% -3.7% 
2007 250532.1 226823.6 3344.4 8719.6 1.4% 4.0% 
2008 255662.9 220912.1 5130.8 -5911.5 2.0% -2.6% 
       
Source: NASS, USDA 
*Crops included: barley, corn for grain, all cotton, oats, all potatoes, all rice, sorghum for grain, 
soybeans, sugar beets and all wheat  
 
million acres planted. One would expect that with the RFS, there would be a net increase 
in planted acreage in order to sustain the added demand. The 9 million acre decreased 
acreage is about a 3% drop overall. While this does not directly represent total supply of 
crops due to yield improvements over these years, it serves as a good starting point for 
our analysis. 
 As we move toward the implementation of the RFS in 2005, we begin to see 
larger swings in acreage overall, with a net increase of 3.5% from 2005 to 2008 (about 
8.6 million acres). But the industry still falls short of 2000 acreage and the highest in the 
set at approximately 264 million acres in 1996. But overall, we do observe three 
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consecutive years of increasing planted acreage from 2005 onward. We might say that 
this is the market responding to increased profitability by expanding supply. 
Of course, the commodity of primary interest here is corn, summarized in table 4. 
As we correlate the corn plantings with overall acreage, there is an ambiguous link. We 
would expect to find that corn acreage increases concurrently with overall plantings since 
corn is the crop used to meet the RFS. But the planted acreage shows a decrease, then an 
increase followed by another decrease in planted acres from 2005 to 2008. This is a 
contradictory signal in that one would expect there to be a continued acreage expansion 
in corn. This can not be explained perfectly by the data here, but it is noteworthy that 
from 2005 to 2006 there was a 4% drop in planted acres, the very year after the RFS was 
first implemented. One might suspect that it may have been enacted after it was too late 
to change 2006 planting decisions, but the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (which outlines the 
 
Table 4. Acreage Shifts in Corn 1996 – 2008 (thousands of acres) 
Year Total Acres Year to Year Change Year to Year Percent 
Change 
 Planted Harvested Planted Harvested Planted Harvested 
1996 79229 72644         
1997 79537 72671 308 27 0% 0% 
1998 80165 72589 628 -82 1% 0% 
1999 77386 70487 -2779 -2102 -3% -3% 
2000 79551 72440 2165 1953 3% 3% 
2001 75702 68768 -3849 -3672 -5% -5% 
2002 78894 69330 3192 562 4% 1% 
2003 78603 70944 -291 1614 0% 2% 
2004 80929 73631 2326 2687 3% 4% 
2005 81779 75117 850 1486 1% 2% 
2006 78327 70648 -3452 -4469 -4% -6% 
2007 93600 86542 15273 15894 19% 22% 
2008 87327 78940 -6273 -7602 -7% -9% 
Source: NASS, USDA 
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RFS) was signed in July of 2005. There would have been plenty of time to prepare for the 
new demand.  
 This may explain the dramatic reaction in 2007 plantings. Here we see that 
planted corn acreage was 19% higher than 2006 in 2007. In figure 6 we can also observe 
that the average price of corn was $2.00 in 2005, not a signal to significantly increase 
output. Therefore, acreage declined in 2006. However, in that year the average price of 
corn increased to historic highs at $3.04 per bushel, a modest 50% increase over the 
previous year. This would at least partially explain the rapid response in acreage in 2007. 
The price-leading behavior is illustrated in the chart well. It is quite obvious, especially in 
the most recent years that planted acreage positively responds to a change in price. What 
is not explicit here is the decline in acres following a peak in prices for the 2007 point. 
But the prices here are the average for a marketing year, whereas the plantings are 
formulated once in the springtime. Although the average for 2007 may have been the 
historical high, the last half of the marketing year would have fallen, leading to a lower 
price in 2008. This falling price would be the signal to producers to cutback production 
and decrease output in the following year. There are agronomical reasons for this 
behavior as well. Soybeans and cotton are often grown in rotation with corn. Even when 
a price is higher than average, farmers recognize the scientific advantages in the long-
term of continuing this rotation in spite of better current prices. The acreages related to 
this phenomenon are analyzed following here. Prices continued to improve, especially in 
the spring of that year into the new crop marketing year, yet acreage fell by 7%. It may be 
too early to tell, but was this more of a response to the anticipated feedback that 2007 was 
an overreaction to market signals? There must be other factors involved. A key to 
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 Figure 6. Corn Price and Plantings 1996-2008. 
 Source: NASS, ERS 
 
 
answering this question is in part revealed by the harvested acres in 2007. Favorable 
conditions led to a 22% increase in harvested acres over 2006, which would have 
increased supply more than anticipated. This may have led to the decline in 2008.  
 Returning to the inconsistent behavior of the ten crop set and corn, I will mention 
again the relationship between soybeans, cotton and corn. Crops are traditionally grown 
in rotation with a complementary commodity. In the case of corn, this relationship is met 
by soybeans and cotton. Therefore it is necessary to explore the behavior in these market 
segments as well. Figure 7 shows the inverse behavior between corn and the cotton-
soybean complex. This graph plots the percentage changes in planted acreage from year 
to year for corn and the sum of soybeans and cotton acres.  
A quick observation can be made that these changes in acreage are almost exactly 
opposite each other and would explain where the additional corn acres would be coming 
from. In fact, in the most dramatic year of acreage changes for corn, 2007, we see a 
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Figure 7. Changes between Corn, Soybean and Cotton Acres 1996-2008 (thousands of acres) 
 Source: NASS, USDA 
 
nearly exact offsetting of acreage in the cotton-soybean complex. Table 5 shows that 
while 15 million additional acres of corn were planted, cotton and soybean acres were 
reduced by 16.3 million. These proportions are not always as close as this, but the fact 
that this fit occurred in the sharpest year of acreage shifts is significant to note.  
Concerns have also been raised in the biofuels debate regarding the effects of the 
RFS on the food supply and influencing prices in the wheat markets. It is vital to 
understand that corn is not typically grown in the same areas as wheat. Hence the 
domestic terms “corn belt” and “wheat belt.” Agricultural markets recognize that the 
growing conditions required for these two starkly different crops are just as distinct as the 
crops themselves. But table 6 at least confirms that the corn acreage changes have not 
been in sync with changes in wheat. At the same time that corn acres experienced years 
of ups and downs in planted acreage, wheat followed the trends of the 10 crop set, for all 
twelve years of these datasets. Note the 19% increase in corn plantings (15 million acres) 
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Table 5. Planted Acreage Shifts in Corn, Soybeans and Cotton 1996 – 2008 (thousands of acres) 
Year Total Acres Year to Year Change 
 Corn Cotton and Soybeans Corn Cotton and Soybeans 
1996 79229 78847.5   
1997 79537 83903 308 5055.5 
1998 80165 85417.5 628 1514.5 
1999 77386 88603.5 -2779 3186 
2000 79551 89783.2 2165 1179.7 
2001 75702 89843.5 -3849 60.3 
2002 78894 87920.9 3192 -1922.6 
2003 78603 86883.6 -291 -1037.3 
2004 80929 88866.6 2326 1983 
2005 81779 86277.4 850 -2589.2 
2006 78327 90796 -3452 4518.6 
2007 93600 74458.2 15273 -16337.8 
2008 87327 83779 -6273 9320.8 
Source: NASS, USDA 
 
Table 6. Planted Acreage Shifts in Wheat 1996 – 2008 (thousands of acres) 
Year Total Acres Year to Year Change Year to Year Percent 
Change of 10 Crops 
 Planted Harvested Planted Harvested Planted Harvested 
1996 75105 62819     
1997 70412 62840 -4693 21 -6.2% 0.0% 
1998 65821 59002 -4591 -3838 -6.5% -6.1% 
1999 62664 53773 -3157 -5229 -4.8% -8.9% 
2000 62549 53063 -115 -710 -0.2% -1.3% 
2001 59432 48473 -3117 -4590 -5.0% -8.7% 
2002 60318 45824 886 -2649 1.5% -5.5% 
2003 62141 53063 1823 7239 3.0% 15.8% 
2004 59674 49999 -2467 -3064 -4.0% -5.8% 
2005 57229 50119 -2445 120 -4.1% 0.2% 
2006 57344 46810 115 -3309 0.2% -6.6% 
2007 60433 51011 3089 4201 5.4% 9.0% 
2008 63457 56586 3024 5575 5.0% 10.9% 
       
Source: NASS, USDA 
 
 
79
in 2007. The biofuel antagonists suggest that this cuts into acreage available for wheat 
but in the same year wheat expanded by 5%. From 2005 - 2008, while corn decreases, 
increases, then decreases again in terms of planted acreage, wheat increases for all three 
years. This would suggest that the link between biofuels and raw supply of wheat is non-
existent domestically. It does not however address the issue of substitutability between 
corn  and wheat use. There may be an increase in wheat for livestock feed and other uses, 
decreasing its availability for food. This demand side tradeoff is not explored here but 
may support the food vs. fuel debate. 
Price to Supply Ratio 
A stark contrast between the pre-RFS and post-RFS periods is revealed. Structural 
change in each of the markets is identified where the average deviation from the mean 
after the RFS is much larger than before the mandates. This level of change varies 
somewhat from crop to crop, but the difference is dramatic. The tables and datasets for 
each crop may be found in Appendix B.  
 Figure 8 is a visual illustration of the price to supply ratio for corn. The fact that 
this is the least dramatic of the three crops analyzed here will be shown below. But the 
keys to understanding this chart are found in the spikes at different points. The peak in 
1974 reflects the current events of the time. The Soviet Union was going through a period 
of grain shortages and U.S. farmers were obliged to accommodate them with supplies. 
That increased demand to such a point that prices increased faster than supply, raising the 
ratio from lower levels. Subsequently, smaller spikes occurred in the 1980’s and 1990’s 
as a result of droughts or minor changes in farm policy. The increase in 2006 is far less 
dramatic. This is reflected in the production shifts outlined in the acreage analysis above. 
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As price ballooned after 2006, supply expanded to the point of keeping in line with the 
historic proportions of the ratio. Again, this is very different from what is observed in 
soybeans and wheat. 
 Figure 8.  Corn Price to Supply Ratio 1970-2008. 
 
Looking on the surface, there is no identifiable structural change. But statistically 
speaking, we might say there is an identifiable structural shift. For the 35 year group, the 
mean was calculated at 0.2585. The standard deviation was 0.0705. In the first period 
from 1972 – 2005, the average deviation from the mean was 0.04. But for the period after 
the RFS, the average deviation from the mean was -0.41, indicating that the rate of 
change from the mean had changed to negative compared to all 35 years and at a similar 
proportion. However, this -0.41 average deviation was for 3 years versus the 0.4 for 32 
years, suggesting that there might be a stronger adjustment in the later time span. 
 Looking at the short-term, we can see that this is true. The mean for the 9- year 
group was calculated to be 0.198. The standard deviation was 0.0348. For the period 
before the RFS was in place (2000-2005), the average deviation from the mean was -
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0.37. But in the period after the RFS it strengthened to 0.80. This is more than twice as 
large as the previous period. It is an indication that a significant change has taken place in 
the market structure after the corn ethanol mandates have been made. 
Moving over to soybeans, there is some consistency with what is happening in the 
corn market (see figure 9). Over the 35 year group, the mean of the price supply ratio in 
the moving average is 2.471 with a standard deviation of 0.5946. For the years leading up 
to the RFS, the average deviation from the mean was 0.07 compared to -.074, suggesting 
that price shrank faster than supply in the years after the RFS compared to previously. 
But again, the results are different when the time frame is shortened to reflect more 
relevant market conditions to the time which RFS began.  
 
Figure 9. Soybean Price to Supply Ratio 1970 – 2008 
 
The mean of the moving average from 2000-2008 was 1.806 with a standard 
deviation of 0.3423. The average deviation from the mean for the 9 year group before the 
RFS (through 2005) was -0.25. But after the initiation of the RFS, an average deviation of 
0.37 from the mean is observed from 2006 to 2008 compared to the 9 years as a whole. 
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This implies that at least for the most recent decade, soybeans have likewise gone 
through an uncharacteristic structural change in the relationship of price to supply. It is 
no surprise when recalling that soybeans and corn are grown in concert with one another. 
Often the production of one is at the expense of another which is why it is vital to do the 
analysis on soybeans as well as corn. The consistency is evidence that there is actual 
behavioral and structural change taking place, at least in the corn-soybean complex.  
The same analysis must be performed with wheat. The justification is to, again, 
review the possibility that the unintended effects of the RFS have transpired into other 
markets, especially the other grains. For the 35 year group of data in wheat, the mean of 
the moving average was 1.052 with a corresponding standard deviation of 0.2999. The 
average deviation from the mean from 1970 through 2005 was -0.18. But in the case of 
the years after the RFS, there is a stark difference to corn and soybeans. From 2006-2008, 
the average deviation from the mean was 2.08. Of course, this would demonstrate that the 
years after the RFS are sharply different for wheat than for corn and soybeans. This does 
not imply causality of the RFS to the changes in wheat, but it does represent the possible 
correlation between the two. Of course, as outlined below, this can be partially explained 
away by the stocks to use ratio for wheat in the next section, but it is an important 
question to ask. Figure 10 represents these changes for wheat. 
In fact, the 9 year group may also explain away the relationship by diminishing 
the significance of the correlation to wheat market changes after the RFS. The mean of 
the moving average for 9 year group of wheat price to supply ratio was 1.22 and a 
standard deviation of 0.4168. The average deviation from this mean was -0.50 from 
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2000-2005 compared to 1.20 from 2006-2008. This presents an overall shrinkage of the 
price to supply ratio changes for the decade leading into the years of the RFS compared  
Figure 10.  Wheat Price to Supply Ratio 1970-2008. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
to the 35 year history of wheat. There is a simple reason that these changes would be 
different from corn and soybeans – they are based in agronomy. Wheat is grown in drier 
areas compared to corn and soybeans. The varying production conditions required for the 
three crops have led to the delineation of a corn belt versus the wheat belt regions of the 
United States agricultural profile. 
Stocks to Use Ratio 
 The stocks to use ratio history for corn is different than the price to supply history 
of corn. For the years from 1970 through 1999, the stocks to use ratio averages 21%.  
Changes to the farm bill removed the huge stocks that were built up in the late 1980’s, 
when stocks peaked in 1987 at 63%.  The average for the current decade, 2000-2008, 
falls to 15%. Looking closer, the low was in 2004 at 9% followed by 10% in 2007. The 
ratio for 2007 would partially explain the upward support for prices that year and the 
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rebound of stocks to use in 2008 to 14% would explain the slight slipping in prices there. 
Figure 11 illustrates these statistics very well. Notice the inverse relationship between  
 Figure 11.  Corn Stocks to Use Ratio vs. Price 1970-2008. 
 
price and the stocks to use ratio. When the ratio is high, prices fall and when the ratio is 
low, prices rise. This behavior confirms the laws of supply and demand. Note however, 
the degree to which prices rise after the RFS from 2006-2008 as related to the stocks to 
use ratio. This dramatic swing in price would support the evidence of structural change as 
measured by the price to supply ratio.  
Tying the stocks to use ratio into the price to supply ratio might indicate that 
although the statistical change in the price to supply ratio is limited, the dramatic upswing 
in price may not be fully explained. The proportion of price to supply increases at a 
slower rate than in previous periods of market upheaval, but the stocks to use ratio would 
indicate that there have been years with similar levels of stocks with less drastic price 
changes. One would assume that the demand has been sufficiently met and the 100% 
price increase is unaccounted for by a supply or demand analysis. It begs the question as 
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to whether the $4 average price for a bushel of corn in 2007 is justified, and what other 
factors may be influencing price changes. The correlation to the price of crude oil has 
already been presented, and the reader is encouraged to refer back to chapter two where 
that behavior is described. 
But the stocks to use data are sharply different for soybeans, Figure 12. The 
average ratio was 12% from 1970 through 2008. This includes only a couple of 
insignificant outlier years in the 1980s when the ratio rose above 20%. Recall that in 
corn, there were years in the 50% range. Additionally, in the most recent decade, the 
average ratio only fell to 10%. In fact, after 2005, the average stocks to use werr 13%. In 
the two years immediately following the RFS, the stocks to use ratio climbed from 15% 
to 19% respectively and fell sharply to 7% in 2008. Interestingly, this is directly related 
to the large decrease in soybean acres in support of corn as reviewed earlier. This would 
have given way to a decreased soybean supply in 2007, decreased stocks leading into 
2008, and therefore an historically low stocks to use ratio of 7%. 
Figure 12 .  Soybean Stocks to Use Ratio vs. Price 1970 – 2008 
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When price is compared to the stocks to the stocks to use ratio, we observe a 
major inconsistency from 2006 – 2008. At a time when stocks are rising to near-historic 
levels, price is led to unforeseen increases. What we saw in corn, and what we would 
expect to see in this relationship, is an inverse relationship between the two. But what this 
data suggests is that a fundamental change is taking place within the soybean markets. It 
also begs the question as to whether or not the supply and demand analysis can account 
for the price swing. In this case, the stocks to use ration certainly does not. What will be 
interesting to observe in 2009, is whether the dramatic decline in the ration will inversely 
or directly correlate to price?  
Wheat is more consistent with traditional economic laws. Figure 13 shows a 
regular inverse pattern between price and the stocks to use ratio. What is significant about 
wheat, however, is the dramatic increase in price after the RFS. There may not be more to 
explore in this market when simply looking at the stocks to use ratio because the highest  
Figure 13.  Wheat Stocks to Use Ratio vs. Price 1970 – 2008. 
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wheat prices ever seen directly correlate to the lowest stocks to use ratio in 38 years. 
Compare a 38 year average stocks to use of 38% with a 29% average from 2000-2008  
and 20% from 2006-2008. Again, in the lowest stocks to use ratio in 38 years of 14% in 
2008, we saw the highest price ever in the same year of $6.80. 
Ending Stocks and Price 
 Equation 1 in the methods section was estimated to determine more formally the 
relationship between ending stocks of corn and corn price.  Please note Figure 14 uses 
ending stocks as opposed to the stocks to use ratio. Data from 1989-2002 were used to 
estimate the curve depicted in Figure 14.  This time period was chosen because it was 
after the huge stocks were eliminated through specific farm program changes in the 
1980’s. The estimated equation was: 
 Price = 3.8728 -0.00175*ending stocks +0.0000004*(ending stocks)2 
Figure 14  Estimated Relationship between ending stocks and price of corn. 
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That equation was used to predict price for the three crop years prior to the 2005 RFS 
mandate, and for the three crop years since that mandate.   The mean square error of the 
residuals for the estimation and two predicting time periods are displayed in Table 7.  
 
   Table 7 – Mean Square Error for Predicting Corn Price from Ending Stocks 
Crop Years Mean Square Error 
1989-90 to 2002-03 0.017 
2003-04 to 2005-06 0.012 
2006-07 to 2008-09 2.782 
   
It is fairly evident from Figure 14 and Table 7 that the relationship between ending corn 
stalks and corn price as changed since the RFS ethanol mandates were implemented.  Is 
this a fundamental change or is this the result of increased speculation from outside of 
agricultural driving prices higher? 
Corn Supply, Demand and Price 
 The supply of corn for each crop year is determined by the beginning stocks on 
hand and prodution for that year. Imports of corn are very small averaging about .1 
percent.  Demand for corn is measured by three broad categories: Food, Seed and 
Industrial Use; Exports; and Feed and Residual Use.   Equation 3, from the Methods 
section was estimated to determine the relationship of each of these broad supply and 
demand categories on the price of corn.  The impact of the government mandate on 
ethanol use in fuel via the RFS was also included in the analysis.  The results are depicted 
in Table 8. 
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Table 8 -   Regression results for predicting the price of corn. 
 Parameter Estimate t Value 
Intercept 3.43171 5.11** 
Beginning Stocks -0.00097 -6.69** 
Production -0.00079 -4.94** 
Seed & Industrial -0.00012 -0.19 
Feed & Residual 0.00106 2.15* 
Exports 0.00098 5.17** 
Government Mandate -4.19771 -2.45* 
Mandate * Industrial 0.00186 2.25* 
Model Adj. R Squared 0.92  
Note: * and ** denote significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. 
 
As economic theory would suggest, an increase in supply (Beginning Stocks and 
Production) lead to a decrease in price.  Both of these parameter estimates are negative 
and significant at the .01 level.  On the demand side, Feed & Residual and Exports are 
both positive and significant.  Again, that would be expected from theory.  However, 
Seed and Industrial is non significant and has the incorrect sign.  The Government 
Mandate dummy variable is significant and the interaction term between the government 
mandate and the food, seed and industrial category (Mandate * Industrial) is positive and 
significant.  The implication from this analysis is that prior to the RFS mandates on 
ethanol use the food, seed and industrial category of demand had no impact on price.  
This is likely due to the fact that this category changed very little from year to year.  
However, since the RFS mandate, this category has had a positive and significant impact 
on the price of corn.  From the standpoint of the corn growers who have lobbied 
incessantly for ethanol policy, it has been a success.  Corn prices have increased because 
of the RFS ethanol mandates. 
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Segregated Use and Price 
 One question that this paper is trying to answer is if the recent rise in commodity 
prices are justified at their current levels. It has been shown in this paper that ethanol 
production has expanded rapidly, increasing the demand for corn as an input into that 
process. As implied by the stocks to use ratio, beginning stocks have remained relatively 
stable in the years since the RFS. However, one observation in the chart depicted in 
Figure 15 is the rapid decline in use or corn for non-ethanol purposes. This may be a 
function of the price rises since 2005 causing the quantity demanded of corn in the feed 
and other sectors to decline. This raises two new issues regarding the unintended 
structural changes in the corn market: 1. Has the RFS caused the prices to rise and, 2. If it 
is determined that RFS caused price increases, is the RFS therefore responsible for the 
contracting of other sectors dependent on corn? Or, in other words, has the RFS been 
implemented at the expense of other goods? How do we determine which sectors to 
support and how to divert resources?  Is this the role of government? The RFS is  
 
Figure 15 – Corn Use vs. Price 1980 – 2008 
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explicitly enforced to address climate change, rural economy and energy independence 
issues. But who should decide what benefit to cost ratio is sufficient to support the RFS? 
Futures Market Survey Results 
 Before continuing, the reader should review the methods employed in distributing 
the survey and compiling the results to better understand what the statistics mean and 
how they were calculated. In chapter 3, a study performed by Informa Economics 
detailed the changing profile of futures trading participants in the BOTs as a whole. 
While the Informa study was inconclusive as to the relationship between speculation and 
volatility, it confirmed that there have been significant changes in the trading centers after 
the RFS was implemented. The purpose of this survey was to measure those changes on 
commodity futures broker activities for those who serve the commercial traders. Again, if 
changes have occurred, we may identify an additional characteristic of the structural 
adjustments which are the result of the RFS mandates. We may not prove causality, but 
we may strengthen the notion that a correlation exists. 
 Overall, the survey was distributed to 88 country brokers randomly selected from 
various online phone directories. The criteria was to select as many as contact info was 
available for independent or small brokerage firms in 17 major agricultural states. 25 
responses were received for a 28.5% response rate. 95% of respondents were registered 
with the National Futures Association as introducing brokers (IB) and 1 was a certified 
trading advisor (CTA). All respondents marked that their primary business activity was 
brokering, except for the CTA which chose storage as their main business. No other 
significant differences were documented in any of the other survey questions. The 
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ranking of commodity volume traded through these firms was as follows: 1. Corn, 2. 
Soybeans, 3. Wheat, 4. Live Cattle, 5. Hogs, 6. Dairy, 7. Oats, and, 8. Barley. 
 The respondents were first asked for whom they acted as broker in the futures 
market. For all surveys returned, 91.3% said they trade for commodity producers, 73.9% 
said commodity users, 69.6% said non-commercial traders, 65.2% said they trade in-
house and 47.8% said storage firms. This broadly reflects the group of brokers surveyed 
in that they were desirably rural brokers who were closest to the commercial futures 
trading activities. The responses were also consistent for the ranking of volume traded 
through the firms on behalf of the customers. For all responding firms, the ranking was: 
1. Producers, 2. Users, 3. Non-commercial, 4. In-house, and, 5. Storage firms. In the 
hedonic coding, commodity user trading and non-commercial volume had very similar 
rankings with averages of 2.65 and 2.7 respectively. There seemed to be no correlation to 
geographical location or any other variable and the profile of these brokers’ customers. 
Again, this affirms that the target group was reached by the survey. 
 One of the chief changes to BOTs since the RFS has been the dramatic increase in 
trading volume. But a serious question which has been posed and was addressed by the 
Informa study is who is responsible for the increase in volume. If purely speculators, then 
extended research should be done on the effects of those participants on the price 
volatility and inflationary pressure. In any case, this particular relationship should be 
explored more, but this survey aimed to answer whether or not this increased volume was 
partially attributable to the commercial group. In this survey, there was an overall 
increase in volume across all respondents. The hedonic variable approaches 1 at 0.739. 
Three respondents said there was an uncharacteristic change in volume since 2006 while 
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only two reported a slight decrease in volume. Of those who reported an increase in 
trading volume, 69.5% said the increased volume was for corn futures contracts. This 
could be based in the expanded corn production and use as presented earlier. We can not 
tell from this data. But across all data, 47.8% said these increases were from producers, 
21.7% said from users, 13% said speculators and 8.69% said storage firms and another 
8.69% said all traders equally. It is interesting that 47.8% said the volume increase came 
from producers, given that it is producers who produced more corn recently. It is equally 
significant that only 21.7% said users, as the corn use increased as much as corn 
production. It may be that the users serviced by these brokers are millers or feedlots and 
not ethanol plants, as those two sectors would not change their usage levels immediately 
as a result of the RFS.  
 Participants were also asked if there had been a decrease in trading volume in any 
of the major commodity futures contracts. 28.6% said they saw a decrease in live hog 
contracts traded, 19.04% for both wheat and dairy contracts, and appropriately only 
14.3% for corn. For the decreases in wheat and corn volume, the respondents universally 
said this was from producer trades. It may be that these particular producers chose to 
assume more risk in the cash market instead of hedging their crops. It would make sense 
since futures and cash prices reached historic levels in the most recent few years. It also 
suggests that corn trading volume has increased in considerably more firms than it has 
decreased when compared to 69% saying corn trades have increased, corresponding with 
the Informa study of the CFTC data. 
 A question regarding the volume of commodity which was hedged through these 
brokers was also asked. This portion of the survey aimed to address whether or not 
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commercial traders were changing their attitudes toward risk. Overall, brokers reported 
that producers slightly increased the proportion of their crops which they hedged. The 
hedonic coefficient for this question was 0.5 with only two respondents reporting a slight 
decrease in hedged commodity. For storage firms, the proportion of their inventory 
hedged increased by the same level, 0.5. But the largest increased in hedged commodity 
was attributed to agribusiness clients with a slight increase and a hedonic coefficient of 
0.69.  
 Another interesting component of this survey was whether or not these rural 
brokers had seen a change in new accounts opened in their brokerage from year to year. 
The average responses would indicate that there have been no radical changes in this 
regard, but there was a more variable response than in other portions of the survey. The 
responses ranged from uncharacteristic increases to uncharacteristic decreases. For those 
responsible for opening the new accounts, 69.5% said they came from producers, 17.3% 
said from speculators and 13% from users. The 17.3% new accounts from speculators 
would draw special attention as the profile of respondents indicates they mostly cater to 
the rural, commercial trader. If there is a significant increase in the non-commercial 
traders through independent, rural brokers, additional investigation may be merited to 
discover the affiliation of these participants.  
 Those surveyed were also asked two open-ended questions. The first was whether 
or not they felt that the futures markets were functioning sufficiently to fulfill the 
purposes for which they were established. These purposes are mainly price discovery and 
risk management. The responses could be easily segregated into two groups of equal size. 
Half of the respondents answered that the markets are running well while the other half 
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said no. The explanations for the answers varied but there was some regularity of specific 
objections. For those who said the markets were dysfunctional, 5 of 9 said there were 
basis or convergence problems. Another 3 felt speculators, especially hedge and index 
funds, were contributing to the problem. Other explanations included volatility and 
problems with delivery points. There was limited specificity, but it is clear this half of the 
brokers surveyed feel the markets have lost functionality. The second question dealt with 
whether or not the respondents felt the level of regulation of the markets was sufficient. 
In contrast, those who responded that the futures markets were accomplishing their 
mission mentioned some problems which need to be addressed but the total number who 
named a problem were less overall. The most common named problem was from 4 of the 
9 in this group who said that the increased volatility was an issue. 
 The second question was meant to determine the group’s attitude was toward 
regulation of the markets. There was very limited response to this question and very 
erratic answers.  
 Clearly the results of this survey indicate that there has been a disruption of the 
futures markets. A large concession is made that a major disadvantage of this survey is 
that is has no method of comparing real data from the time period before the RFS. 
However, as the survey is reviewed, the instructions were explicit in that each response 
was to be how the broker compared the current market conditions to the prior period. An 
important aspect of the survey is that all of the respondents have noticed a marked change 
in market behavior and at least half feel the markets are falling short of their reason for 
existence. When considering the pool of brokers reached, namely the rural independent 
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brokers who are most likely to serve the commercial commodity traders, serious concern 
is raised regarding the ability of the BOTs to function efficiently.  
Changes to Farmer Income 
 Seldom in the world of economics does one thing change while all else remains 
equal. This is also the case for farmers who have been the recipients of the higher 
commodity prices in recent years. While we make the connection between the higher 
prices and the RFS, it is difficult to directly single out the effect the desirable prices have 
on net income received. In the previous chapter, the results of an increased demand for 
corn were discussed. It was argued that during period 2 of the transition to accommodate 
the RFS that increased demand for corn would transpire into increased pressure for 
inputs. It was argued that land rents would be bid up as well as limited resources such as 
fertilizer.  
 This is precisely what took place from 2005 to 2008. The ERS index of fertilizer 
prices paid by farmers more than doubled from an average 168 to 433 in 2008. Fuel 
prices reached similar levels during the same period as well, although fuel had been 
increasing since before 2005. While the fertilizer price increases may be a direct result of 
the RFS, fuel price increases are most likely to have increased due to macro demand 
factors. In any case, these dramatic swings in cost must be accounted for when analyzing 
the net income changes from pre to post RFS periods.  
One characteristic of the markets of interest here is the changing structure of risk. 
Here we will define risk as the exposure to variability in outcome. As the variability 
increases, so does the risk. If variability increases, the market is more stable and risk has 
decreased.  
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 Figure 16 is a graphical representation for the expected net return per acre for a 
corn farm in Arkansas as plotted by a cumulative distribution function. The vertical axis 
represents the total number of outcomes accounted for as moving across the horizontal 
axis as measured in percent. The horizontal axis is expected net return per acre in dollars. 
Statistically, the data offered here indicates that for the pre RFS period, an average loss of 
$2.66 could be expected for the farms represented in this example. On the other hand, in 
the post RFS period, or in 2008, the farms represented here might expect an average 
return of $204.24 per acre.  
The most striking characteristic of this graph is the relative difference in slope 
between the pre and post RFS periods. If we consider the definition of risk offered above, 
we would say that the risk structure between the two periods is dramatically different. 
The sheer range of possible outcomes is much broader in the post period than before the 
RFS. One of the ways this can be measured statistically is the coefficient of variance. It is 
calculated by dividing the mean value for a data set by its standard deviation. A smaller  
Figure 16. Net Return per Acre for Corn. 
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coefficient of variance would imply a wider distribution of outcomes. The coefficients for 
the pre RFS and post RFS periods here are 3.26 and .92 respectively, indicating that the 
exposure of farmers to variability in net returns after the RFS is roughly 3.5 times larger 
than before.  
 In some cases, this would cause the level of risk aversion to increase. Farmers 
who focus solely on increasing costs might be deterred from excpanding output to avoid 
the potential losses. In the cases analyzed here, fuel prices increased by 180% and 
fertilizer prices by 142%. It is certainly true that costs have significant bearing on net 
return. In fact, as a percentage of overall operating costs, fuel and fertilizer costs 
increased from 12% and 22% to 26% and 29% of variable costs in these scenarios. These 
input costs do seem extraordinarily high and would jusitfy farmers avoiding taking on 
this risk exposure. However, the anal;ysis overall shows that the farm price increased 
sufficiently to compnesate these higher costs. The most important result of this analysis 
here, is the proportional effect each of these variable have on net returns. Even though 
fuel and fertilizer have more than doubled, their carry into overall costs is limited by 
some smaller proportion. On the other hand, when farm prices received increase, it is a 
direct enhancement on total revenue. 
 While the outsomes in this section may seem unreasonable, recent data released 
by the USDA would support these findings. The ERS records that from 2005 to 2008, 
gross farm income rose from $115.2 billion to $182.1 billion. For feed crops this rose 
from $24.7 billion to $61.4 billion. Fertilizer costs for all farms rose from $12.8 billion to 
$27.5 billion. Fuel also increased from $10.3 billion to $16.3 billion. But after factoring 
in all costs, the United States farm net income rose from $79.3 billion to $89.3 billion. At 
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the time fo this writing, no specific data regarding the net income changes for a more 
specific set of crops, but the author submits that most of the national increase would have 
come from feed grains, substantiating the analysis done on the corn enterprise budget 
above. 
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Chapter 6 – Conclusions 
 The RFS is the single largest change to come to American agriculture in at least 
30 years. Although it directly affects the market for corn because of the demand for corn 
ethanol, it has certainly sent reverberations throughout the farm sector. Perhaps the most 
important complication of the RFS is the fact that it is such a complex issue. It is so tied 
to economical, political, environmental and social issues that to measure the implications 
is challenging at best. 
Summary 
The most obvious change to come to ag markets since the RFS was introduced is  
price inflation. Never have prices for agricultural commodities reached levels as were 
seen in the most recent three years of commodity marketing. In addition, Prices have 
become more volatile. Whether or not this can be assigned to a causal relationship with 
ethanol is not certain, but the increased correlation to the volatility of the crude oil market 
is indisputable.  
In addition, we may not necessarily attribute these price structure changes to the 
fundamentals of commodity markets alone. Acreage shifts in each respective commodity 
have been within the historical norms of behavior in terms of tradeoffs and year to year 
changes. Production has seemed to keep pace with demand in the corn sector, except in 
the most recent years where non-ethanol demand has slipped, most likely due to 
increased prices. However, it would also seem that U.S. farmers are not responsible for 
the increases in wheat prices considering that wheat acreage has not been affected by the 
response to ethanol mandates. We may not know whether or not demand substitution 
between corn and wheat has been a contributing factor, but production behavior has not 
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changed significantly in wheat. All these changes were predicted in our discussion of 
theoretical changes in chapter four, and were greatly confirmed. In fact, the price 
responses were more irregular on the fundamental side than would have been expected, 
leading to the idea that some other factors were largely responsible for the structural 
change. Again, while these primary responses may have been predictable and expected, 
there have been other changes not intended or foreseen by policy makers. 
The futures broker survey was significant in that it confirmed trading activity 
changes even down to the commercial side of commodity markets. It was inconclusive as 
to whether the futures markets still perform effectively, but a serious question is raised 
when half of the respondents note a problem with their functioning. This may settle in the 
long-term, but during this period of adjustment, trading participants must struggle to find 
their feet while confirming that environments, energy security and rural economies in 
general are not all that are affected by sweeping government mandates. 
Finally, we have also shown a partial explanation of the USDAs findings that 
farm income has increased in the most recent production years. At the same time, farm 
income has become more variable from period to period and from farm to farm. Again, 
this is a result of the increased uncertainty as influenced by crude oil prices and the 
mandates linking farm economies to energy markets. 
Implications 
 What is indisputable is that since the implementation of the RFS, ag markets and 
especially corn have experienced volatility not observed in recent decades. This is in part 
due to the inextricable link which now ties agriculture to energy. Although the energy 
markets may not be so much influenced by the farm sector, agriculture producers and 
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users are now exposed to the variability in energy markets. While crude oil was once a 
determining factor in farm production costs, it is now also a determining factor in farm 
revenue, more so than ever before. 
 The RFS was implemented as U.S. energy policy for many reasons. Without order 
of importance, the first of these was domestic energy independence. It is difficult to 
reconcile this notion, however, when considering the contrasting data regarding the 
energy contribution of ethanol. The research done in this field is yet in its infancy, but 
policy has jumped to the assumption that research was supportive of expanding corn 
ethanol. This is still a debated issue and it should give pause to lawmakers that three 
years after the initial introduction of the RFS, the topic is still not settled and has not 
reached a consensus. 
 Perhaps more intriguing is the idea that the RFS and corn ethanol are meant to 
address global climate change. Just like the energy issues, there is still no consensus 
regarding the greenhouse gas emissions of corn ethanol. In fact, if longitudinal trends are 
any indication of an approaching agreement, we might assume that the GHG emissions 
alone are worse than gasoline. The more recent research tends to lean this way. 
Additionally, there are all the other unintended environmental impacts discussed in 
chapter 3 which go beyond climate change. Again, this topic is not yet settled either. 
 On the issue of farm income, this goal of the RFS has been attained, at least 
temporarily. It has been shown, according to the economics discussion in chapter 4, that 
we would expect farm incomes to increase as a result of the RFS. To add to this, the 
research reviewed in chapter 3 supports the notion that rural economies have been 
positively affected by corn ethanol expansion. This was all substantiated by the analysis 
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given in the previous chapter. However, a daunting question remains unanswered. We 
predicted that in period 3 after the market equilibrium has been settled, long run profits 
would return to zero. The first two periods in the theoretical discussion have been 
validated. It will only be a few years before we know whether or not our predictions of 
the third period will come to pass.  
 Compounding the concern is the notion that the EPA may reconsider the 
effectiveness of corn ethanol to battle climate change. Remember it is the EPA which has 
the authority to implement the RFS, but the EPA is primarily concerned with 
environmental issues and, as in the case of ethanol, not how various enterprises affect the 
economy. Should the EPA reverse U.S. RFS policy, particularly the portion met by corn 
ethanol, the effects on the farm sector should be considerable. 
 The one true economic lesson in this thesis is that, irrespective of free market 
forces, government has an enormous ability to affect economic sectors. Additionally, 
when government intervenes in the marketplace on behalf of a political agenda (whether 
that agenda is worthy or not), the market reacts in complex ways not addressed by the 
original policy. The environmental issues related to ethanol are the perfect example of 
this. In the name of curbing global climate change, the U.S. energy policy was adjusted 
once in 2005 then drastically more in 2007. Now, there is a new argument which says 
corn ethanol harms the environment more than the fuels they were attempting to replace.  
Governments can create demand, but it will always be an artificial demand not supported 
by the free market. A fundamental question in economics is implicitly answered in these 
cases as to how scarce resources should be rationed. The RFS decides how capital, land 
and other resources are allocated and clearly has broad economic ramifications. But in the 
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end, we must decide what the proper role of government should be and seek the correct 
balance between social issues and issues of commerce. This thesis clearly illustrates that 
the two aspects are not wholly separable and that we cannot know all the effects of one 
particular policy before implementing it. These situations create unintended 
consequences which eventually diminishes the efficiency of the marketplace. 
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Chapter 7 – Reflections 
 When I first began this thesis, I really had no direction on how to approach the 
topic. I was frustrated to see so many different sides of the ethanol debate focus solely on 
the facts that would support their particular position. I had a personal interest in the topic 
and in doing simple fact finding research I was always left wanting for information 
because there was no single source which addressed the debate in full. I have come to 
find that in addition to individual bias for each groups’ position, the scope of ethanol and 
biofuels in general is so large that it is truly impractical to sufficiently cover all the 
aspects related to it. The problem with this inherent complexity, however, is that the 
socio-economic truth is in danger of being diluted in a soupy mixture of ideas and 
philosophies.  
 What have I learned from this experience? That when an idea which has the 
potential to affect so many sectors of society and economic conditions in general is put 
forth, the value of forethought in implementation of related policy is inestimable. 
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Survey Questions 
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Futures Broker Survey 
Applied Economics Department 
Utah State University 
 
The purpose of this survey is to gain an understanding of the effects that major changes in 
grain markets have had on hedging and speculative activity in the futures markets.  
Identifying the source and impacts of recent market changes is also of interest. Individual 
survey responses will not be reported in any manner, so as to maintain complete 
confidentially.  
General 
You or your organization are/is registered as a (Select all that apply): 
 FCM           IB           CPO           CTA 
The primary business (respecting agricultural commodities) of your organization is: 
 
For whom do/does you or your organization trade agricultural futures (Select all 
that apply): 
  Producers               Storage firms              Grain Users             Non-commercial                
Self                 I don’t trade agricultural commodities 
Please rank the following trading entities, in terms of volume handled, for whom 
you act as a broker in the futures market (1 – highest volume, 5 – Lowest volume): 
Producers       Storage firms       Grain Users        Non-commercial       Self (in house)    
On average, how would you say the volume of agricultural commodities traded 
through your firm has changed since 2003? 
 
Which commodity contracts have experienced the most increases in volume at your 
firm? 
 
Which trading party is most responsible for these increase in volume at your firm 
for that commodity? 
 
If any commodity contracts experienced significant decreases in volume traded by 
your firm, which has been the most notable? 
 
Which trading party is mostly responsible for these decreases in trading at your 
firm for that commodity? 
 
 
Hedging Issues 
As a proportion of a typical producer’s annual crop (for accounts handled by your 
firm), the volume of contracts producers use for hedging purposes has: 
 
As a proportion of a typical elevator company’s storage capacity (for accounts 
handled by your firm), the volume of contracts elevators use for hedging purposes 
has: 
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As a proportion of a typical agribusiness account handled by your firm, the volume 
of contracts agribusinesses employ for hedging purposes have: 
 
Since 2003, the number of new individual trading accounts opened at your firm 
annually has: 
 
Which market trading entity represents the largest portion of these new accounts? 
 
For non-commercial traders, which agricultural commodities are most traded 
through your firm (please rank 1 – highest, 8 – lowest) 
Corn      Wheat     Soybeans    Barley      Oats      Live Cattle     Hog      Dairy  
Compared to the years before 2003, most current hedging strategies now have taken 
positions that are                                                in duration. 
 
 
 
Explanation section 
According to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the futures market 
“serve the important function of providing a means for price discovery and offsetting 
price risk.” In your opinion, how well do you feel this function is being performed in 
recent years? Please explain. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Do you feel the current level of regulation is sufficient or insufficient to manage the 
futures markets? What regulatory changes could be made to assure the integrity of the 
futures markets? Please Explain. 
 
 
 
 
The purpose of this survey is to gain insight and understanding regarding the recent 
market volatility and changes in market behavior. It also serves as a foundation to further 
measure real changes in market activities and seek understanding of the implications of 
the current market conditions. Further and more in depth analysis will require real data on 
a firm by firm basis. Would your organization be willing to participate in a more detailed 
survey by providing specific proprietary data to enhance the accuracy of such a study? 
Any data received will be kept in the strictest confidence. 
Yes                    No 
If yes, who is the best person to contact?__________________________________ 
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If you are interested in receiving a summary report of the findings of this survey, please 
complete the address below.  Once again, no attempt will be made to tie the address to 
the answers given.  Information from this last page will be coded in a separate file from 
the data. 
Name ________________________________________ 
Address ______________________________________ 
Address ______________________________________ 
City, ST Zip ___________________________________ 
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Appendix B 
Analysis Data 
 
 
1
Corn – 
Planted Acres, Production, Supply, Use, Price and Ratios 
Year Planted Acres 
(1000 acres) 
Beginning Stocks 
(1000 bu.) 
Production 
(1000 bu.) 
Imports 
(1000 bu.) 
Total Supply 
(1000 bu.) 
Use 
(1000 bu.) 
National Average Price 
(U.S. dollars) 
Price:Supply 
(times 1000) 
Price:Supply 
3 Year Moving Average 
Deviations 
from the 
mean 
1970 66863 1003 4144 4 5151 4495 1.33 0.2582   
1971 74179 662 5634 1 6297 5187 1.08 0.1715   
1972 67126 1124 5568 1 6693 6000 1.57 0.2346 0.2214 -0.53 
1973 72253 706 5659 1 6366 5896 2.55 0.4005 0.2689 0.15 
1974 77935 483 4692 2 5176 4826 3.02 0.5834 0.4062 2.09 
1975 78719 557 5829 1 6387 5767 2.54 0.3977 0.4606 2.87 
1976 84588 632 6276 2 6910 5789 2.15 0.3111 0.4307 2.44 
1977 84328 1133 6491 2 7627 6207 2.02 0.2648 0.3246 0.94 
1978 81675 1433 7253 1 8687 6995 2.25 0.2590 0.2783 0.28 
1979 81394 1706 7912 1 9618 7604 2.52 0.2620 0.2620 0.05 
1980 84043 2030 6625 1 8656 7282 3.11 0.3593 0.2934 0.50 
1981 84097 1389 8102 1 9491 6975 2.5 0.2634 0.2949 0.52 
1982 81857 2531 8218 0 10750 7249 2.55 0.2372 0.2866 0.40 
1983 60207 3516 4166 2 7683 6693 3.21 0.4178 0.3061 0.68 
1984 80517 1004 7656 2 8662 7032 2.63 0.3036 0.3196 0.87 
1985 83398 1645 8857 10 10511 6494 2.23 0.2121 0.3112 0.75 
1986 76580 4031 8209 2 12241 7385 1.5 0.1225 0.2128 -0.65 
1987 66200 4871 7116 3 11991 7757 1.94 0.1618 0.1655 -1.32 
1988 67717 4250 4918 3 9171 7260 2.54 0.2770 0.1871 -1.01 
1989 72322 1926 7516 2 9444 8120 2.36 0.2499 0.2295 -0.41 
1990 74166 1342 7917 3 9262 7761 2.28 0.2462 0.2577 -0.01 
1991 75957 1518 7459 20 8997 7915 2.37 0.2634 0.2532 -0.08 
1992 79311 1098 9457 7 10562 8471 2.07 0.1960 0.2352 -0.33 
1993 73239 2109 6324 21 8454 7621 2.5 0.2957 0.2517 -0.10 
1994 78921 848 10029 10 10887 9352 2.26 0.2076 0.2331 -0.36 
1995 71479 1555 7385 16 8956 8548 3.24 0.3618 0.2884 0.42 
1996 79229 425 9213 13 9651 8789 2.71 0.2808 0.2834 0.35 
1997 79537 881 9188 9 10078 8791 2.43 0.2411 0.2946 0.51 
1998 80165 1305 9738 19 11062 9298 1.94 0.1754 0.2324 -0.37 
1999 77386 1783 9411 15 11209 9515 1.82 0.1624 0.1930 -0.93 
2000 79551 1714 9894 7 11615 9740 1.85 0.1593 0.1657 -1.32 
2001 75702 1895 9483 10 11388 9815 1.97 0.1730 0.1649 -1.33 
2002 78894 1593 8948 14 10555 9491 2.32 0.2198 0.1840 -1.06 
2003 78603 1084 10066 14 11165 10230 2.42 0.2168 0.2032 -0.78 
2004 80929 956 11781 11 12748 10661 2.06 0.1616 0.1994 -0.84 
2005 81779 2110 11089 9 13207 11268 2 0.1514 0.1766 -1.16 
2006 78327 1963 10509 12 12484 11207 3.04 0.2435 0.1855 -1.03 
2007 93600 1301 13011 20 14331 12737 4.2 0.2931 0.2293 -0.41 
2008 87327 1621 12076 15 13712 12000 3.9 0.2844 0.2737 0.22 
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Soybeans – 
Planted Acres, Production, Supply, Use, Price and Ratios 
Year Planted Acres 
(1000 acres) 
Beginning Stocks 
(1000 bu.) 
Production 
(1000 bu.) 
Imports 
(1000 bu.) 
Total Supply 
(1000 bu.) 
Use 
(1000 bu.) 
National Average Price 
(U.S. dollars) 
Price:Supply 
(times 1000) 
Price:Supply 
3 Year Moving Average 
Deviations 
from the 
mean 
1970 43082 42249 246 1127.1 1451 1345 2.85 1.9644   
1971 43476 42705 106 1176.101 1363 1286 3.03 2.2229   
1972 46866 45683 77 1270.608 1435 1372 4.37 3.0443 2.4105 -0.10 
1973 56549 55667 64 1547.543 1718 1536 5.68 3.3054 2.8575 0.65 
1974 52479 51341 183 1216.287 1483 1282 6.64 4.4774 3.6090 1.91 
1975 54590 53617 201 1548.344 1857 1595 4.92 2.6499 3.4776 1.69 
1976 50269 49401 262 1288.608 1640 1530 6.81 4.1534 3.7602 2.17 
1977 58978 57830 110 1767.267 2000 1827 5.88 2.9406 3.2480 1.31 
1978 64708 63663 172 1868.754 2170 1983 6.66 3.0686 3.3876 1.54 
1979 71411 70343 188 2260.665 2605 2222 6.29 2.4148 2.8080 0.57 
1980 69930 67813 383 1797.543 2305 1970 7.6 3.2969 2.9268 0.77 
1981 67543 66163 335 1989.11 2461 2189 6.07 2.4661 2.7259 0.43 
1982 70884 69442 272 2190.297 2614 2245 5.71 2.1845 2.6492 0.30 
1983 63779 62525 368 1635.772 2117 1929 7.83 3.6980 2.7828 0.52 
1984 67755 66113 188 1860.863 2178 1840 5.84 2.6817 2.8547 0.65 
1985 63145 61599 338 2099.056 2582 2009 5.05 1.9560 2.7786 0.52 
1986 60405 58312 573 1942.558 2650 2183 4.78 1.8039 2.1472 -0.54 
1987 58180 57172 467 1937.722 2540 2216 5.88 2.3153 2.0251 -0.75 
1988 58840 57373 323 1548.841 1983 1789 7.42 3.7413 2.6202 0.25 
1989 60820 59538 195 1923.666 2254 1998 5.69 2.5243 2.8603 0.65 
1990 57795 56512 256 1925.947 2319 1967 5.74 2.4756 2.9138 0.74 
1991 59180 58011 352 1986.539 2479 2182 5.58 2.2505 2.4168 -0.09 
1992 59180 58233 298 2190.354 2642 2329 5.56 2.1046 2.2769 -0.33 
1993 60085 57307 313 1869.718 2318 2095 6.4 2.7605 2.3719 -0.17 
1994 61620 60809 224 2514.869 2918 2560 5.48 1.8778 2.2476 -0.38 
1995 62495 61544 358 2174.254 2687 2491 6.72 2.5005 2.3796 -0.15 
1996 64195 63349 196 2380.274 2751 2610 7.35 2.6722 2.3502 -0.20 
1997 70005 69110 141 2688.75 3021 2807 6.47 2.1417 2.4381 -0.06 
1998 72025 70441 214 2741.014 3147 2775 4.93 1.5663 2.1267 -0.58 
1999 73730 72446 373 2653.758 3214 2904 4.63 1.4404 1.7161 -1.27 
2000 74266 72408 310 2757.81 3263 2998 4.54 1.3915 1.4661 -1.69 
2001 74075 72975 265 2890.682 3358 3136 4.38 1.3043 1.3787 -1.84 
2002 73963 72497 222 2756.147 3174 2984 5.53 1.7421 1.4793 -1.67 
2003 73404 72476 191 2453.845 2820 2700 7.34 2.6026 1.8830 -0.99 
2004 75208 73958 120 3123.79 3466 3193 5.74 1.6560 2.0003 -0.79 
2005 72032 71251 273 3068.342 3558 3077 5.66 1.5909 1.9499 -0.88 
2006 75522 74602 480 3196.726 3908 3294 6.43 1.6453 1.6308 -1.41 
2007 63631 62820 614 2677.117 3486 3267 10.1 2.8970 2.0444 -0.72 
2008 74533 72121 219 2959.174 3393 3195 9.25 2.7264 2.4229 -0.08 
 
 
 
2
Wheat – 
Planted Acres, Production, Supply, Use, Price and Ratios 
Year Planted Acres 
(1000 acres) 
Beginning Stocks 
(1000 bu.) 
Production 
(1000 bu.) 
Imports 
(1000 bu.) 
Total Supply 
(1000 bu.) 
Use 
(1000 bu.) 
National Average Price 
(U.S. dollars) 
Price:Supply 
(times 1000) 
Price:Supply 
3 Year Moving Average 
Deviations 
from the 
mean 
1970 48739 1051 1446 1 2498 1618 1.33 0.5325   
1971 53822 880 1731 1 2612 1558 1.34 0.5131   
1972 54913 1053 1653 1 2707 2069 1.76 0.6501 0.5652 -1.62 
1973 59254 638 1829 3 2471 2107 3.95 1.5988 0.9206 -0.44 
1974 71044 364 1905 3 2272 1807 4.09 1.8002 1.3497 0.99 
1975 74900 465 2274 3 2742 2030 3.55 1.2948 1.5646 1.71 
1976 80395 712 2297 3 3012 1822 2.73 0.9064 1.3338 0.94 
1977 75410 1190 2187 2 3379 2120 2.33 0.6895 0.9636 -0.29 
1978 65989 1259 1898 2 3160 2172 2.97 0.9400 0.8453 -0.69 
1979 71424 988 2282 2 3272 2308 3.8 1.1614 0.9303 -0.41 
1980 80788 964 2546 3 3513 2455 3.99 1.1359 1.0791 0.09 
1981 88251 1058 2978 3 4039 2799 3.69 0.9137 1.0703 0.06 
1982 86232 1240 2956 8 4204 2584 3.45 0.8207 0.9567 -0.32 
1983 76419 1620 2587 4 4211 2716 3.51 0.8335 0.8559 -0.65 
1984 79213 1495 2774 10 4280 2756 3.39 0.7921 0.8154 -0.79 
1985 75535 1524 2592 17 4133 2096 3.08 0.7452 0.7903 -0.87 
1986 71998 2037 2235 23 4295 2348 2.42 0.5635 0.7003 -1.17 
1987 65829 1947 2254 17 4218 2870 2.57 0.6094 0.6393 -1.38 
1988 65529 1348 1938 24 3310 2560 3.72 1.1239 0.7656 -0.95 
1989 76615 750 2178 24 2952 2378 3.72 1.2603 0.9978 -0.18 
1990 77041 574 2919 39 3531 2603 2.61 0.7391 1.0411 -0.04 
1991 69881 928 2117 44 3089 2581 3 0.9712 0.9902 -0.21 
1992 72219 508 2637 75 3220 2653 3.24 1.0062 0.9055 -0.49 
1993 72168 567 2562 116 3246 2638 3.26 1.0043 0.9939 -0.19 
1994 70349 608 2482 98 3188 2646 3.45 1.0823 1.0309 -0.07 
1995 69031 542 2334 73 2948 2546 4.55 1.5434 1.2100 0.53 
1996 75105 402 2435 99 2936 2461 4.3 1.4647 1.3635 1.04 
1997 70412 474 2653 101 3229 2456 3.38 1.0468 1.3516 1.00 
1998 65821 772 2724 110 3606 2595 2.65 0.7349 1.0821 0.10 
1999 62664 1011 2454 101 3567 2551 2.48 0.6953 0.8257 -0.75 
2000 62549 1015 2382 96 3494 2557 2.62 0.7499 0.7267 -1.08 
2001 59432 937 2082 115 3134 2303 2.78 0.8871 0.7774 -0.91 
2002 60318 831 1717 83 2631 2105 3.56 1.3533 0.9967 -0.18 
2003 62141 525 2507 67 3099 2515 3.4 1.0970 1.1124 0.20 
2004 59674 584 2306 75 2966 2388 3.4 1.1464 1.1989 0.49 
2005 57229 577 2249 87 2913 2303 3.42 1.1739 1.1391 0.29 
2006 57344 611 1934 130 2675 2187 4.26 1.5928 1.3044 0.84 
2007 60433 488 2193 120 2801 2474 6.48 2.3134 1.6934 2.14 
2008 63457 327 2672 128 3128 2366 6.8 2.1741 2.0268 3.25 
 
 
 
3
Ten Crop Set – 
Planted Acres (1000 acres) 
 
Year All Barley Corn for Grain All Cotton Oats All Potatoes All Rice Sorghum Soybeans Sugarbeets All Wheat Total 
1970 10476 66863 11945 24410 1450 1826 16957 43082 1478 48739 227226 
1971 11061 74179 12355 21831 1432 1826 20547 43476 1406 53822 241935 
1972 10567 67126 14001 19990 1301 1824 17035 46866 1420 54913 235043 
1973 11045 72253 12480 18605 1330 2181 18994 56549 1280 59254 253971 
1974 8713 77935 13679 17013 1422 2550 17588 52479 1252 71044 263675 
1975 9373 78719 9478 16434 1299 2833 18080 54590 1595 74900 267300 
1976 9301 84588 11636 16620 1404 2489 18143 50269 1525 80395 276370 
1977 10778 84328 13680 17732 1399 2261 16636 58978 1273 75410 282474 
1978 9989 81675 13375 16407 1401 2993 16197 64708 1305 65989 274040 
1979 8116 81394 13978 13960 1295 2890 15277 71411 1161 71424 280906 
1980 8320 84043 14534 13381 1175 3380 15639 69930 1231 80788 292422 
1981 9618 84097 14330 13632 1255 3827 15930 67543 1252 88251 299735 
1982 9549 81857 11345 13951 1303 3295 16028 70884 1054 86232 295498 
1983 10411 60207 7926 20289 1271 2190 11880 63779 1081 76419 255454 
1984 11934 80517 11145 12414 1334 2830 17254 67755 1124 79213 285520 
1985 13139 83398 10685 13235 1407 2512 18285 63145 1125 75535 282465 
1986 13024 76580 10045 14671 1257 2381 15339 60405 1232 71998 266931 
1987 10929 66200 10397 17907 1317 2356 11756 58180 1267 65829 246138 
1988 9831 67717 12515 13907 1285 2933 10343 58840 1327 65529 244227 
1989 9125 72322 10587 12085 1305 2731 12642 60820 1324 76615 259556 
1990 8221 74166 12348 10423 1400 2897 10535 57795 1400 77041 256226 
1991 8941 75957 14052 8653 1408 2884 11064 59180 1427 69881 253447 
1992 7762 79311 13240 7943 1339 3176 13177 59180 1437 72219 258784 
1993 7786 73239 13438 7937 1390 2920 9882 60085 1438 72168 250283 
1994 7159 78921 13720 6637 1422 3353 9787 61620 1476 70349 254444 
1995 6689 71479 16931 6225 1401 3121 9429 62495 1445 69031 248246 
1996 7094 79229 14653 4638 1455 2824 13097 64195 1368 75105 263658 
1997 6706 79537 13898 5068 1384 3125 10052 70005 1459 70412 261646 
1998 6325 80165 13393 4891 1416 3285 9626 72025 1498 65821 258444 
1999 4983 77386 14874 4668 1376 3531 9288 73730 1561 62664 254060 
2000 5801 79551 15517 4473 1383 3060 9195 74266 1564 62549 257360 
2001 4951 75702 15769 4401 1247 3334 10248 74075 1365 59432 250524 
2002 5008 78894 13958 4995 1300 3240 9589 73963 1427 60318 252692 
2003 5348 78603 13480 4597 1274 3022 9420 73404 1365 62141 252654 
2004 4527 80929 13659 4085 1192 3347 7486 75208 1346 59644 251423 
2005 3875 81779 14245 4246 1108 3384 6454 72032 1300 57214 245638 
2006 3452 78327 15274 4166 1139 2838 6522 75522 1366 57334 245941 
2007 4018 93527 10827 3763 1142 2761 7712 64741 1269 60460 250220 
2008 4234 85982 9470 3217 1058 2995 8284 75718 1091 63147 255196 
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Appendix C 
Corn Production Budget 
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Enterprise Budget for Corn Production in Arkansas – University of Arkansas, Division of Agriculture, 2009   
     
                  
     AMOUNT UNIT  PRICE  PRODUCER SHARE  TOTAL 
                  
GROSS RETURNS PER ACRE          
Corn    170    bu  $          5.71  100%  $       970.70  
producer share of yield  170      
VARIABLE COSTS PER ACRE          
Fertilizer          
0-75-75  1 acre  $      139.92  100%  $       139.92  
Urea 46%    217 lb  $          0.45  100%  $         97.65  
32% N  375 lb  $          0.31  100%  $       116.25  
Herbicides         
Glyphosate Plus  2 pt  $          4.25  100%  $            8.50  
Atrazine 4L    4 pt  $          1.38  100%  $            5.52  
Irrigation pipe, install / remove  0 acre  $        10.30  100%  $                -    
Seed    33 thous  $          2.06  100%  $         67.98  
insecticide seed treatment  33 thous  $          0.20  100%  $            6.60  
Drying    0 bu.  $          0.19  100%  $                -    
Custom Hire        $                -    
Ground Appl Fertilizer  1 acre  $          5.00  100%  $            5.00  
Ground Appl Herbicide  2     acre  $          5.00  100%  $         10.00  
Custom Haul  170 bu.  $          0.21  100%  $         35.70  
Labor: Irrigation   0.0974 hrs  $          8.19  100%  $            0.80  
Labor: Operator   0.6885 hrs  $          9.45  100%  $            6.51  
Labor: Hand   0.1433 hrs  $          8.19  100%  $            1.17  
Fuel    31.1759 gal  $          4.00  100%  $       124.70  
Repairs    1.00 acre  $        26.32  100%  $         26.32  
Interest (1/2 year)   1.00 acre  $        21.21  100%  $         21.21  
TOTAL VARIABLE COST            $       673.83  
RETURNS ABOVE VARIABLE COST     $       296.87  
           
FIXED COSTS/ACRE           
  Depreciation & Interest on equipment     $         38.96  
  Land Rent / Acre        $                -    
TOTAL  FIXED COST            $         38.96  
           
RETURN TO OPERATOR LABOR, LAND, CAPITAL, AND MGT*   $       257.91  
*above returns do not include government payments     
           
Producer break-even price:       $            4.19  
           
Break-even yield:             124.8 
 
